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ABSTRACT 
Essays in Applied Microeconomics 
Lesley Jeanne Turner 
 
This dissertation broadly focuses on the role government should play in providing and financing 
education. The first chapter estimates the economic incidence of need-based student aid, one tool 
intended to ameliorate credit constraints in the market for higher education. The second chapter 
examines whether government programs providing support to low-income families should 
explicitly support or deny access to higher education by analyzing the impact of college 
attendance on the labor market outcomes of current and former welfare recipients. Chapter 3 
focuses on publicly provided education at the primary and secondary levels, and estimates the 
impact of a teacher incentive pay program on student achievement. 
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In the United States, like many developed countries, government provides substantial 
support for primary, secondary, and postsecondary education. In 2011, expenditures on 
education equaled 7.6 percent of GDP (National Center for Education Statistics 2011). At the 
postsecondary level, federal grants and loans for college students aim to ameliorate credit market 
imperfections. Publicly provided K-12 education insures universal access to human capital 
development for all children. This dissertation broadly addresses the question what role 
government should play in financing and providing education.  
The first chapter estimates the economic incidence of need-based student aid, one tool 
used to address credit market imperfections in the market for higher education. The federal Pell 
Grant Program provides billions of dollars in subsidies to low-income college students to 
increase affordability and access to higher education. Using regression discontinuity (RD) and 
regression kink (RK) designs, I show that 16 percent of all Pell Grant aid is passed-through to 
schools in the form of higher effective prices. Additionally, I reconcile differences between RD 
and RK estimates using a framework in which the treatment of Pell Grant aid is 
multidimensional: students receive an additional dollar of Pell Grant aid and are also labeled as 
Pell Grant recipients. RD estimates confound the effects of these dimensions, which have 
opposite impacts on schools’ pricing decisions. With my combined RD/RK approach, I am able 
to separately identify schools’ willingness to pay for students categorized as needy and the 
pricing response to outside subsidies.  
The second chapter of my dissertation examines whether government programs providing 
support to low-income families should explicitly support or deny access to higher education. I 
1
estimate the impact of college credits and credentials on the labor market outcomes of several 
cohorts of current and former welfare recipients. I use an event-study approach to control for 
time-invariant individual characteristics, such as differences in ability and motivation. Women 
who are induced to attend college after entering welfare experience large and significant earnings 
gains, however, these returns are driven by credential receipt and when sub-associate’s degree 
credentials are unobservable, positive earnings gains will be inappropriately attributed to college 
attendance alone.  
The final chapter of my dissertation addresses the question of how to efficiently provide 
education at the primary and secondary levels. Teacher compensation schemes are often 
criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive 
pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. My coauthor and I 
examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate 
whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the 
program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to 
free-ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results 















The federal government provides billions of dollars in targeted need-based aid to low-income 
college students every year. Although students are the statutory recipients of this aid, its 
economic incidence may fall partially on schools (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). Specifically, 
schools may strategically increase recipients’ effective prices, crowding out federal aid by 
reducing discounts provided through institutional aid. Concurrent tuition and student aid 
increases combined with substantial growth in the for-profit sector of higher education 
underscore the importance of evaluating federal aid crowd out.  
In this paper, I estimate the economic incidence of the federal Pell Grant Program, the 
largest source of need-based student aid in the United States, using detailed student-level data 
from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study. I show that institutions capture 16 percent 
of all Pell Grant aid – approximately $6 billion in 2011 – through price discrimination. 
Furthermore, I illustrate that the extent and pattern of capture vary substantially by institutional 
control and selectivity. For example, on average, public schools do not capture any Pell Grant 
aid, while among students attending selective nonprofit schools, decreases in institutional aid 
crowd out over 50 percent of the value of Pell Grant aid. Additionally, the incidence of the Pell 
Grant Program also varies across students within some sectors. For instance, among public 
school students near the Pell Grant eligibility threshold, Pell Grant aid appears to crowd in rather 
than crowd out institutional aid.  
I identify these impacts using discontinuities in the relationship between Pell Grant aid 
and the federal government’s measure of student need. Specifically, the Pell Grant Program’s 
schedule contains discontinuities in both the level and in the slope of aid, resulting in students 
with very similar levels of need receiving significantly different grants. This variation allows me 
4
  
to use both regression discontinuity (RD) and regression kink (RK) designs (Angrist and Lavy 
1999; Hahn et al. 2001; Card et al. 2009; Nielsen et al. 2010). My analysis illustrates the 
relationship between these two methods and provides an example of circumstances under which 
RD and RK designs will yield significantly different conclusions.  
The RK approach relates the change in the slope of the Pell Grant schedule at the 
eligibility cut-off with the change in the slope of the institutional aid schedule at this same point. 
RK estimates imply that, on average, schools capture a portion of Pell Grant aid through price 
discrimination. In contrast, the RD approach relates the change in the level of Pell Grant aid at 
the eligibility cut-off with the change in the level of institutional aid at this same point. RD 
estimates imply that, on average, schools increase institutional aid for Pell Grant recipients.  
I reconcile these disparate estimates using a framework in which the “treatment” of Pell 
Grant receipt is multidimensional. Specifically, students at the margin of Pell Grant eligibility 
receive an extra dollar of outside aid but are also given the label of being a Pell Grant recipient, 
which may change some institutions’ willingness to direct resources towards them. I show that it 
is possible to identify both schools’ willingness to pay for students categorized as Pell Grant 
recipients and their pricing response to outside subsidies using a combined RD/RK approach.  
RD estimates only identify the combined impact of these dimensions, and near the Pell 
Grant eligibility threshold, a greater willingness to pay dominates the pass-through of outside aid 
from students to schools. This result is misleading, however, since using my combined RD/RK 
approach, I estimate that fewer than one third of Pell Grant recipients benefit from these 
transfers. This is because the pass-through of each additional dollar of Pell Grant quickly 
overtakes these schools’ willingness to pay for needy students. My results suggest that, on 
average, Pell Grant recipients receive an additional $260 in institutional aid due to schools’ 
5
  
willingness to pay for needy students, but every additional dollar of Pell Grant aid is crowded out 
by a 22 cent reduction in institutional aid. 
My paper is one of the first to combine these two identification strategies and the first to 
explicitly show how a multidimensional treatment affects RD estimates. Although the Pell Grant 
Program provides an especially stark example of how a multidimensional treatment affects RD 
estimates, in other circumstances where both a discontinuity and a kink are present, my results 
suggest that additional information can potentially be gained from using my combined RD/RK 
approach. 
Little is known about how institutions compete for students or the objectives of public 
and nonprofit schools. This paper provides insight into the industrial organization of higher 
education by showing how variation in schools’ response to Pell Grant aid relates to differences 
in schools’ objectives and market power across sectors. Public schools demonstrate a willingness 
to pay for students categorized as Pell Grant recipients. Although the net capture of Pell Grants 
in the public sector is close to zero, increases in institutional aid for recipients near the eligibility 
threshold come at the expense of the neediest Pell recipients. Conversely, selective nonprofit 
institutions appropriate 79 percent of their students’ Pell Grants, suggesting these schools have 
considerable market power.  
The for-profit sector of higher education has grown substantially over the last decade and 
in recent years, has been criticized for unethical marketing practices and financial aid fraud (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2010).  Although these schools disproportionately serve 
federal aid recipients, I find that for-profit institutions behave no differently than nonselective 
nonprofit schools and, combined, these schools appropriate only 18 percent of their students’ 
Pell Grants.  
6
  
Finally, this paper contributes to a broader literature on the effectiveness of targeted 
subsidies and the importance of considering impacts on the behavior of both consumers and 
firms.1 Research by Long (2004) and Turner (2012) suggests that other sources of financial aid 
crowd out institutional discounts by as much as 100 percent. However, previous studies 
specifically focusing on the Pell Grant Program estimate a positive correlation between prices 
and Pell Grant generosity. These impacts are identified using time-series variation in the 
maximum award, variation that is likely correlated with unobservable year specific shocks to the 
economy (e.g., McPherson and Schapiro 1991; Singell and Stone 2007).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the Pell Grant 
program and previous estimates of the impact of student aid on prices. Section 1.3 discusses the 
NPSAS data and presents descriptive statistics, while Section 1.4 describes the regression kink 
design and my estimation strategy. Section 1.5 presents results from RD and RK estimates and 
Section 1.6 provides a conceptual framework that reconciles differences between these estimates. 
I estimate the overall incidence of the Pell Grant Program in Section 1.7, while Section 1.8 
concludes. 
1.2 The Pell Grant Program and Need-based Student Aid  
An extensive literature estimates large private returns to higher education and positive 
externalities associated with a highly educated population.2 Between 1979 and 2009, real tuition 
and fees increased by close to 200 percent, outpacing growth in income and student aid (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2011). If some individuals face credit constraints and cannot 
                                                 
1 For example, Rothstein (2008) shows that Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) induced increases in labor supply 
drive down wages, and firms receive over half of the benefit of EITC payments. Hastings and Washington (2010) 
show that grocery stores benefit from public assistance via cyclical pricing in response to recipients’ impatience. 
 
2 For example, see Card (1999), Moretti (2004), Lochner and Moretti (2004), and Dee (2004). 
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borrow against future income to finance college attendance, education levels may be inefficiently 
low. For these reasons, the United States federal and state governments provide substantial 
subsidies to low-income college students.  
Established to promote access to postsecondary education, the Pell Grant Program is the 
largest source of need-based student aid in the United States. In 2011, the program provided 9.5 
million low-income students with subsidies totaling $35 billion. The maximum Pell Grant award 
has grown in generosity from $452 during the 1973-1974 school year (hereafter, 1974) to $5,550 
in 2011, a 62 percent increase in real terms (Figure 1.1). However, over this period the 
purchasing power of the maximum Pell Grant award declined (Figure 1.2). In 2010, the 
maximum Pell Grant represented 42 percent of average tuition and fees at public institutions and 
only 17 percent at private schools (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011).  
A student’s Pell Grant award depends both on the annual maximum award and upon her 
expected family contribution (EFC), the federal government’s measure of need. Students are 
required to complete a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) to qualify for Pell 
Grants and other federal student aid (e.g., loans, work-study). FAFSA inputs include a detailed 
set of financial and demographic information, such as income, untaxed benefits, assets, family 
size and structure, and number of siblings in college. When filing the FAFSA, students also must 
specify up to (but no more than) six schools they are considering attending.3  
The federal government calculates a student’s EFC using a complicated, non-linear 
function of these inputs (e.g., U.S. Department of Education 2006). The federal government 
provides the listed schools with the student’s EFC and FAFSA inputs, and these schools 
calculate federal (and in some cases state) grants and loans. With this information in hand, 
                                                 
3 Beginning in 2009, students could specify up to 10 schools that would receive their FAFSA information.  
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schools choose how institutional aid will be distributed across students. Thus, a school observes 
the student’s FAFSA, EFC, and outside aid before deciding the level of its own discount, which 
it provides via institutional aid. Students receive a financial aid package from each school 
specifying federal, state, and institutional grant aid and loans. Students do not observe their Pell 
Grant award until this point, where it is included as a component of the final price displayed in 
their financial aid package.  
A full-time, full-year student i in year t qualifies for a Pell award equal to: 
(1.1)          200,400400400  ittittittit EFCmaxPellEFCmaxPellEFCmaxPellPell 11  
Where maxPellt is the maximum Pell award available in year t (Figure 1.1), EFCit is the expected 
family contribution of student i in year t, and  1  is the logical indicator function. Pell Grant 
awards are rounded up to the next $100 and students qualifying for an award between $399 and 
$200 receive $400.4 Students who qualify for less than $200 in aid do not receive a Pell Grant. 
The Pell Grant formula generates two sources of variation that I use for identification. First, 
crossing the Pell Grant eligibility threshold leads to a discrete increase in a student’s statutory 
award, from $0 to $400, which enables me to use a regression discontinuity design. Second, the 
variation created by the change in the slope of the Pell Grant-EFC function, from 0 to -1, allows 
me to use a regression kink design.5 Figure 1.3 displays the Pell Grant award schedule in 1996, 
2000, 2004, and 2008.6  
                                                 
4 The minimum Pell Grant award increased to $890 in 2009, $976 in 2010, and $1176 in 2011. However, the 
minimum award remained $400 in the years I examine.  
 
5 The Pell Grant formula for part-time students is   0,max ittit EFCmaxPell0.5Pell  ; the change in the slope of the 
relationship between EFC and Pell Grant aid is -0.5. The minimum Pell Grant does not depend on attendance 
intensity. Part-year students receive a prorated Pell Grant. 
 
6 Eligibility for other types of federal aid (e.g., Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants, Stafford loans, work 
study) also depends on the EFC. The Pell Grant Program is the only federal entitlement for college students.   
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1.2.1  Previous Estimates of the Impact of Pell Grant Aid on College Enrollment and Prices 
Tuition and financial aid influence important outcomes, from the decision to enroll in 
college, to persistence and degree completion (Angrist 1993; Bound and Turner 2002; Dynarski 
2003; Bettinger 2004). Although the Pell Grant Program aims to increase low-income students’ 
access to higher education, past research finds little impact on college enrollment except for 
older, non-traditional students (Kane 1995; Seftor and Turner 2002, Deming and Dynarski 
2010). Students only receive information concerning the level of their Pell Grant after they have 
submitted a FAFSA, and this information is provided as part of a school’s financial aid package, 
where the final price (tuition net of state, federal, and institutional grants) is likely the most 
salient feature. If low-income students lack information about the Pell Grant Program, Pell Grant 
aid may not increase college enrollment. The complexity of the FAFSA form imposes a large 
cost on potential students (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2008). Bettinger et al. (forthcoming) 
show that information on the availability of financial aid and assistance with the FAFSA 
application process increase the likelihood of enrollment. 
The relatively weak response of student demand to Pell Grant aid suggests the potential 
for schools to appropriate student aid through price increases. However, previous studies show 
no conclusive evidence that increases in Pell Grant generosity cause schools to raise prices. 
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) show that overall institutional aid levels are positively 
correlated with Pell Grant generosity; Singell and Stone (2007) find a positive correlation 
between published tuition and Pell Grant generosity among private institutions. In both cases, 
identification comes from time-series variation in the maximum Pell Grant.  
Raising tuition is only one method schools may use to benefit from Pell Grant generosity. 
Schools can also adjust students’ prices through price discrimination by reducing institutional 
10
  
aid. The practice of price discrimination, or offering a schedule of prices that varies according to 
consumer demand elasticities, has been documented in a variety of imperfectly competitive 
markets and the market for higher education is unique in the extensive amount of customer 
information schools observe, including a measure of students’ ability to pay.7  
Two studies explicitly examine whether student aid crowds out institutional aid. Turner 
(2012) estimates the incidence of education tax credits, which primarily benefit middle-income 
students, and finds that schools reduce institutional aid dollar for dollar as tax-based aid 
increases. Long (2004) examines the implementation of the Georgia HOPE scholarship program, 
which provides substantial assistance to students in Georgia who achieve a 3.0 GPA. Public 
schools responded to the HOPE program by increasing fees, capturing 10 percent of HOPE aid, 
while private nonprofit institutions captured 30 percent of HOPE aid by increasing tuition and 
fees and reducing institutional aid. Additionally, using administrative Pell Grant data and a 
simulated instrumental variables approach, Li (1999) finds a positive relationship between Pell 
Grant aid and both listed tuition and net tuition per student. By comparing the impact of Pell 
Grant aid on net tuition per student and listed tuition per student, it is possible to infer whether 
schools also alter institutional aid. Results suggest that four-year institutions both increase tuition 
and reduce institutional aid in response to Pell Grant generosity 
Schools’ response to the HOPE program suggests that the economic incidence of the Pell 
Grant Program may vary by institutional control. Traditionally, public and nonprofit schools 
primarily serve the market for higher education. However, the last decade has seen substantial 
growth in the for-profit sector. For-profit institutions increasingly serve low-income students and 
have been criticized for high student loan default rates and deceptive recruiting practices (U.S. 
                                                 
7 E.g., housing (Yinger 1998), loans (Charles et al. 2008), and vehicles (Langer 2011). 
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Government Accountability Office 2010) and charge significantly higher tuition than comparable 
public schools.8 Influenced by these concerns, “gainful employment” legislation will specifically 
regulate programs primarily offered by for-profit schools beginning in 2012.9  
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) is a restricted-use, nationally 
representative, repeated cross-section of college students.10 I observe each student’s EFC, 
demographic characteristics, FAFSA inputs (e.g., family income and assets), and financial aid 
provided by the federal government and other sources. My sample includes students present in 
the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS waves. I eliminate graduate and first-professional 
students as well as noncitizens and non-permanent residents, as these students are ineligible for 
Pell Grant aid. Additionally, I exclude students who attended multiple schools in the survey year, 
received athletic scholarships, and were not enrolled in the fall semester11  
I exclude all students attending schools that only offer sub-associate certificate programs, 
theological seminaries, and other faith-based institutions, since many of these schools are not 
eligible to distribute federal aid. Finally, I focus on students whose EFC is within $10,000 of the 
Pell Grant eligibility threshold, although in a subset of analyses, I look at students within 
                                                 
8 The share of Pell Grant recipients attending for-profit schools increased from 13 to 25 percent between 2000 and 
2010 (Pell Grant End of Year Reports). Conversely, the share of all students at for-profit schools grew from 4 to 11 
percent (Deming et al. 2012).  The 2009, 15 percent of former for-profit students defaulted on their student loans 
within two years of exiting college. The rates for public and non-profit institutions were 7 and 5 percent, 
respectively. In 2010, average public school tuition was $5,000; for-profit students paid $15,700 (National Center 
for Education Statistics 2011). 
 
9 The legislation requires that for-profit institutions and certificate programs in other sectors prepare students for 
“gainful employment” to qualify for federal student aid (76 FR 34386). 
 
10 After the original 2008 NPSAS sample was drawn, additional observations of National Science and Mathematics 
Access to Retain Talent (SMART) Grant recipients were added. For my main set of estimates, I drop oversampled 
SMART Grant recipients. My results are robust to using the NPSAS sample weights and retaining SMART Grant 
recipients or excluding observations from 2008, the first year of the NPSAS in which students eligible for SMART 




narrower windows around this threshold. My final sample includes approximately 133,270 
undergraduate students attending 1,800 unique institutions. Due to the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ confidentiality requirements, all NPSAS sample sizes are rounded to the 
nearest 10 observations. 
My sample includes new and continuing students. Although upper-year students likely 
have less elastic demand than first year students, EFC and institutional aid are highly correlated 
over time. Schools award multi-year institutional aid packages and for many students, one of the 
primary components of EFC – family income – does not vary substantially over time. 
I classify schools by selectivity and control, distinguishing between public, nonprofit, and 
for-profit institutions that are either selective or nonselective. I use the IPEDS and Barrons’ 
Guide to determine an institution’s selectivity. The IPEDS contains annual data on acceptance 
rates and the Barrons’ College Guide classifies four-year public and nonprofit institutions into 
six categories of selectivity based on acceptance rates, college entrance exam performance, and 
the minimum class rank and grade point average required for admission. First, I classify all for-
profit and institutions offering two-year programs as non-selective. If the IPEDS lists an 
institution as “inclusive” (i.e., open admissions), I also classify it as nonselective. Finally, I 
classify remaining institutions as nonselective if either the Barrons’ Guide lists them as less 
competitive or non-competitive or they are missing Barrons’ rankings and admit more than 75% 
of applicants. Under this scheme, schools I classify as “selective” are not highly selective. 
Rather, these schools reject some portion of applicants.12  
Public schools are either operated by publicly elected or appointed officials or receive the 
majority of their funding from public sources. Conversely, private institutions receive the 
                                                 
12 On average, selective public institutions admit 61 percent of applicants and selective nonprofits admit 56 percent.  
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majority of funding from private sources and are run by privately appointed individuals. 
Nonprofit institutions are exempt from federal taxes but are subject to the “non-distribution 
constraint” which prohibits a school from distributing revenue to its controlling body in excess of 
regular wages and other operating expenses (Hansmann 1980).13 For-profit schools pay corporate 
income taxes, but may also distribute profits to owners or shareholders.  
1.3.1  Characteristics of Students and Schools 
Table 1.1 displays summary statistics by sector. In my sample, for-profit students are the 
most likely to receive Pell Grant aid, while students attending selective institutions are the least 
likely to receive Pell Grants. However, conditional on receiving a Pell Grant, award amounts are 
similar across sectors and approximately three quarters of Pell Grant recipients receive less than 
the maximum award. Schools in all sectors use institutional aid to provide discounts from the list 
price, although students attending for-profit and nonselective public institutions are the least 
likely to receive these discounts. On average, for-profit students are more likely to be non-white 
and are older than students in other sectors. Students attending nonselective schools are more 
likely to be classified as independent, a status given to students who are married, have 
dependents, are veterans, or are older than 24.  
I use information from the Integrated Postsecondary Student Data System (IPEDS) to 
examine overall revenue and expenditures for schools in my sample. The IPEDS contains the 
universe of institutions that receive federal student aid and the U.S. Department of Education 
collects detailed information on school characteristics, enrollment, faculty and staff, and finances 
through annual surveys. Table 1.2 displays institutional revenue and expenditures for each sector 
                                                 
13 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c)(3). Income from activities unrelated to the provision of education is 
subject to taxation (IRC sections 511-514).  
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using data from the IPEDS. For-profit schools are the only institutions that receive a substantial 
portion of revenue from the Pell Grant Program (14 percent). Pell Grants represent only 7 
percent of public nonselective schools’ revenue, 4 percent of revenue in private nonselective 
schools, and only 1 to 2 percent for more selective institutions. With the exception of for-profit 
institutions, these calculations suggest that relative to other sources of revenue, even if 
institutions responded to Pell Grant increases by raising overall tuition, the potential gains would 
be quite small. 
1.4 Empirical Framework 
Previous studies identify the impact of Pell Grant aid on prices using time series variation in the 
maximum award. However, if aid generosity is correlated with unobservable time-varying 
shocks, these estimates will suffer from omitted variables bias. Since Pell Grant generosity also 
varies across students within a given year, it is possible to separate the impact of Pell Grant aid 
from year-specific shocks under the assumption that, conditional on observables, Pell Grant aid 
is not correlated with unobservable student characteristics. This is a strong assumption. Pell 
Grant generosity is increasing in need, and while I can explicitly control for EFC, the specific 
functional form of the relationship between EFC and unobservable heterogeneity is unknown.  
To overcome concerns of omitted variables bias, I take advantage of the relationship 
between Pell Grant aid and EFC. Specifically, I identify the impact of Pell Grant aid on student 
prices using variation induced by the kink and the discontinuity in the relationship between Pell 
Grant and EFC. The kink occurs where the slope of the  efcPell  schedule changes from 0 to -1, 
while the discontinuity is driven by the increase from in Pell Grant aid from $0 to $400 at the 
eligibility threshold, due to the rounding-up of awards scheduled to fall between $200 and $400. 
This variation allows me to use both a regression discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy 1999; Lee and 
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Lemieux 2010) and a regression kink design (Card et al. 2009; Nielsen et al. 2010). Like the 
regression discontinuity design, the regression kink estimator identifies the average treatment 
effect for individuals near the eligibility cut-off under specific conditions. 
1.4.1   Regression Kink and Regression Discontinuity Designs 
 Similar to the regression discontinuity (RD) design, the regression kink (RK) design 
allows for identification of the impact of an endogenous regressor that is a known function of an 
observable assignment variable (Card et al. 2009). Here, the endogenous regressor is Pell Grant 
aid, while EFC is the assignment variable. The RK design uses variation induced by a change in 
the slope of the relationship between Pell Grant aid and EFC as the eligibility threshold is 
approached from above and below. Like the RD design, the RK design will be invalidated if 
individuals are able to sort perfectly in the neighborhood of the kink.  
Let     UEFCgPellfY  ,  represent the causal relationship between institutional 
aid, Y, and Pell Grant aid,  EFCPellPell  , in a given school and year, where U is random 
vector of unobservable, predetermined characteristics. Given the existence of a kink in the Pell 
Grant schedule, the required identifying assumptions are: (1) the direct marginal impact of EFC 
on institutional aid is continuous and (2) the conditional density of EFC (with respect to U) is 
continuously differentiable at the threshold for Pell Grant eligibility (Card et al. 2009). These 
assumptions encompass those required for identification using a RD design, which requires 
institutional aid to be continuous (rather than continuously differentiable) in EFC and that the 
conditional density of EFC be continuous (rather than continuously differentiable). Essentially, 
even if many other factors affect college pricing decisions, as long as there are no discontinuities 
in the relationship between these factors and EFC at the eligibility threshold, the RK estimator 
approximates random assignment in the neighborhood of the kink. Additionally, as in the case of 
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the RD design, the second assumption generates testable predictions concerning how the density 
of EFC and the distribution of observable characteristics should behave in the neighborhood of 
the eligibility cut-off.  
Assume that each additional dollar of Pell Grant aid has the same marginal effect on 
schools’ pricing decisions (at least in the neighborhood of the eligibility threshold): 
(1.2)       PellPellf 1,     
In this case, 1  represents the pass-through of each additional dollar of Pell Grant aid from 
students to schools.  
If the required identifying assumptions hold, the RK estimator identifies: 
(1.3)     
   














































Where 0efc  represents the eligibility threshold for the Pell Grant Program. Since the Pell Grant 
Program’s schedule also contains a discontinuity in the level of aid at the eligibility threshold, I 
can also identify the impact of Pell Grant aid on college pricing decisions using a RD design. As 
long as equation (1.2) describes the relationship between Pell Grant aid and colleges’ pricing 
decisions, the RD estimator also identifies 1 : 
(1.4)      
   

























In practice, my estimation strategy involves “fuzzy” RD/RK. Some eligible students do 
not apply for federal aid and thus, do not receive Pell Grants.14 Additionally, variables in the 
NPSAS contain measurement error induced by random perturbations to preserve respondent 
                                                 
14 Results are robust to eliminating students who do not submit a FAFSA (available upon request).  
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confidentiality. Since the location of the Pell Grant Program’s eligibility threshold changes as the 
maximum award increases, I create a standardized measure of the distance of a student’s EFC 
from the year-specific EFC representing the eligibility threshold: titit efcEFCCFE 0
~  , where 
tefc0  is the cut-off for Pell Grant eligibility in year t and all students with 0
~ itCFE  are 
ineligible for Pell Grant aid.15 Figure 1.4 displays the empirical distribution of Pell Grant aid for 
students in my sample by standardized EFC.16  
Consider the following first stage and reduced form equations: 
(1.5)           ijttjititititit CFECFECFECFEPell 


   ]~[~0~0~ 11  
(1.6)           ijttjititititijt CFECFECFECFEy 


   ]~[~0~0~ 11  
Here, i indexes students, j indexes institutions, and t indexes years. itPell  is the Pell Grant award 
received by student i in year t, while yijt represents the institutional aid provided by school j to 
this student. The term  
`
0
~ itCFE1  is an indicator for Pell Grant eligibility while ρ indexes the 
degree of polynomial in the assignment variable, itCFE
~
. I include year and school fixed effects 
as well as a vector of student characteristic to reduce residual variation; these terms are not 
necessary for identification.17 The ratio of the reduced form and first-stage coefficients for the 
                                                 
15 For the years I examine, efc0t equals $2140 (1996), $2925 (2000), $3850 (2004), and $4110 (2008). 
 
16 In a given year, the kink and discontinuity in the relationship between Pell Grant aid and EFC occur at slightly 
different values of EFC (see Appendix Figure A2). However, the distance between these points is quite small and 
only a small fraction of students have an EFC falling on this “plateau”. I treat both the slope and the level of Pell 
Grant funding changes as occurring at the eligibility cut-off. My results are robust to removing students whose EFC 
falls on the plateau (forcing the discontinuity and kink to occur at the same value of EFC). 
 
17 These characteristics include indicators for gender, race, fall attendance intensity, enrollment length, level (e.g., 
whether the student is a first year, second year, etc.), out-of-state student, and a quadratic in age. 
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ˆ RK , represents the RK 
estimate of the impact of Pell Grant aid on institutional aid. Likewise, the ratio of the reduced 





ˆ RD , represents the RD estimate 
of the impact of Pell Grant aid on institutional aid.  
To further illustrate the mechanics of this framework, Figures 1.5A and 1.5B illustrate 
potential behavior of the relationship between institutional aid and EFC near the eligibility 
threshold (i.e., potential values for γ and β) and corresponding implications for RK and RD 
estimates. In the first case (Figure 1.5A), there is no discontinuity or kink in the relationship 
between institutional aid and EFC near the eligibility cut-off – the change in the level and the 
slope of institutional aid are both equal to zero – indicating students receive the full benefit of 
Pell Grant aid. In this case, the RD and RK estimators both yield an estimate of zero. 
Conversely, Figure 1.5B illustrates the case where Pell Grant aid fully crowds out institutional 
aid. The change in the level of institution aid is equal (in absolute value) to the change in the 
level in Pell Grant aid, suggesting the RD approach will yield an estimate of -1, or full pass-
through of Pell Grant aid from students to institutions. The change in the slope of institutional 
aid at the eligibility threshold is likewise equal (in absolute value) to the change in the slope of 
the Pell Grant schedule at this same point, also resulting in an estimate of -1. As in the first 
example, both RD and RK designs produce the same estimate; in this case, suggesting schools 





1.4.2  Evaluating the RD and RK Identifying Assumptions 
Identification using the RK or RD design hinges on the assumption that students cannot 
exactly sort to obtain a more advantageous EFC. Students and their parents likely act to reduce 
their estimated need, but as long as they cannot chose an exact value of EFC, the RK and RD 
estimators will be consistent (Lee 2008). Although online calculators and guides help families 
predict their potential EFC, these guides are based on prior year Pell Grant schedules and the 
relationship between income and EFC is complicated and non-linear. In the years I examine, the 
maximum Pell Grant awards are set by amendments to the Higher Education Act. However, this 
legislation only specifies authorized annual maximum awards. The appropriated maximum 
award, which determines the actual Pell Grant schedule, is generally smaller than the authorized 
amount. Furthermore, the Department of Education releases the Pell Grant schedule after the end 
of calendar year, making it impossible for families to make real adjustments to most of the inputs 
used to determine EFC (e.g., adjusted gross income). Families might still misreport EFC inputs; 
however, many of these inputs are also reported to the IRS (e.g., adjusted gross income, number 
of dependents) and over one-third of all FAFSA applications are audited through the Department 
of Education’s verification process.18 
Nonetheless, I test for continuity and smoothness in the density of EFC to rule out the 
possibility that students perfectly manipulate their EFCs. Figure 1.6 displays the unconditional 
density of EFC, plotting the proportion of students in each $100 EFC interval. The x-axis 
measures the standardized distance from the Pell Grant eligibility cut-off. I limit the sample to 
                                                 
18 The NPSAS contains an additional year of FAFSA information for continuing students who applied for federal aid 
for the following academic year. For these students, I test whether barely missing the eligibility threshold in the 
current year is correlated with any evidence of strategic behavior for the following year (e.g., bunching to the left of 




students with  2100,2100~ CFE  because of the large mass of individuals with an EFC of 
zero.19 In 1996, a zero EFC corresponds to 2140
~ CFE , thus, this window prevents my 
estimates from being driven by the large increase in density at EFC = 0. Due to the smaller 
window, I use smaller bins ($100) than in other graphical analyses. 
I use the McCrary (2008) test to determine whether the density of EFC is continuous 
across the threshold for Pell Grant eligibility. My method for testing continuity in the derivative 
around the cut-off is less precise, since there is presently no analog to the McCrary test statistic 
for the RK design. I follow Card et al. (2009), collapse the data into $100 EFC bins, and run the 
following regression:  
(1.7)          bbbbbb CFECFECFECFEN 


   ]~[~0~0~ 11  
Where b indexes bins, Nb is the number of students in bin b, ρ is a second order 
polynomial, bCFE
~
is the distance from the eligibility threshold, and a test of 0 estimates 
whether the density function is smooth. Figure 1.6 displays ̂  and the McCrary test statistic as 
well as the corresponding standard errors. I find no evidence that the level or the slope of the 
density changes discontinuously at the eligibility threshold.  
I examine the distribution of predetermined student characteristics around the eligibility 
threshold, including race, gender, dependency status, average SAT score (first-year students 
only), and age; here bins represent $200 EFC intervals (Figures 1.7A through 1.7E).  I also 
estimate equation (1.6), with up to a fifth degree polynomial in EFC, and test for discontinuous 
changes in the slope or level of baseline characteristic at the eligibility threshold. I display results 
                                                 
19 In the years I examine, dependent students and independent students with dependents other than a spouse received 
an automatic zero EFC if (1) anyone in their household receive means tested benefits or their household was not 
required to file IRS Form 1040, and (2) their household income was less than $20,000.  
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from the specification using the optimal degree of polynomial (determined via the Akaike 
Information Criterion) for three different windows around the eligibility threshold in Table 1.3. 
For the majority of specifications, estimated coefficients are insignificant and all coefficients are 
quite small in magnitude. 
Finally, I plot the density of EFC by institutional control and selectivity (Figures 1.8A 
through 1.8E). I find no evidence of a discontinuity in the density or its first derivative among 
public and nonselective private institutions. There is a positive increase in the density of EFC to 
the right of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold among selective nonprofit institutions, but the 
magnitude of the change in density is small and insignificant.20 
1.5 Results 
Figure 1.9 previews my main results. I pool observations from all schools across years and plot 
the relationship between Pell Grant aid, institutional aid, and standardized EFC (e.g., $200 
indicates a student’s EFC is $200 above the cut-off for Pell Grant eligibility). I collapse my data 
into $200 EFC bins and plot average institutional aid and average Pell aid by distance from the 
threshold for Pell Grant eligibility, where both institutional aid and Pell aid are residuals from a 
regression on year and institution fixed effects. Institutional aid is represented by hollow circles, 
with larger circles representing a greater number of students. Average Pell Grant aid is 
represented by the gray “X” markers. The black lines represent the linear fit of institutional aid 
on EFC, estimated separately on either side of the eligibility threshold and weighted by the 
number of students in the bin.21 The dashed gray lines represent the 95 percent confidence 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, the NPSAS only contains information for accepted students who choose to enroll in a specific 
school, making it impossible to determine whether the density of EFC is smooth and continuous for all applicants. 
 
21 Figure 1.10 replicates this exercise, allowing for a more flexible fit of the relationship between institutional aid 
and EFC with a local linear regression. The resulting discontinuity and kink are very similar.  
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intervals for these estimates. Finally, the dashed black line represents the linear fit of average 
Pell Grant aid on EFC for eligible students. At the eligibility threshold, there is both 
discontinuous change in the relationship between EFC and institutional grant aid. For students 
who are ineligible for Pell Grants, there is a positive relationship between need and institutional 
aid, while for students who are eligible for Pell Grant aid, institutional aid is decreasing in need.  
I replicate this exercise by sector (Figures 1.11A through 1.11C). Due to sample size 
constraints, I pool selective and nonselective public schools into a single category and likewise 
group nonselective nonprofit schools (parametric regression estimates, presented in the next 
section, suggest that schools within each of these groups respond similarly to need-based aid). 
The incidence of Pell Grant aid varies substantially between public and private schools, with 
public institutions appearing to supplement Pell Grants with increased institutional aid.22 Private 
institutions’ response to Pell Grant aid is more straightforward. There is a clear discontinuity in 
the slope of institutional aid to the left of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold and a negative, but 
insignificant change in the level of aid among nonselective private schools (Figure 1.11B). There 
is a small, insignificant jump in institutional aid for selective nonprofit schools, but the kink in 
the institutional aid schedule clearly dominates (Figure 1.11C).  
1.5.1  Parametric RD and RK Estimates 
 Table 1.4 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of equations (1.5) and (1.6) with a second 
degree polynomial in CFE
~
. The first two columns display the first stage and reduced form 
estimates, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present separate RK and RD instrument variables 
estimates. Results are consistent with Figure 1.9 – RK estimates suggest that institutions capture 
                                                 
22 To better illustrate the behavior of institutional aid around the eligibility threshold in the public sector, the left axis 
measures institutional aid while the right axis represents Pell aid. 
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around 22 cents of every Pell Grant dollar through a reduction in institutional aid while the RD 
estimator results in a point estimate of 0.32, suggesting schools increase institutional aid by over 
30 cents for every dollar of Pell Grant aid. The test of equality of the RD and RK coefficients 
confirms that these estimated impact is statistically different. The test of equality also serves as a 
formal test of whether the impact of the Pell Grant Program on institutional pricing varies with 
EFC.  
Before further investigating the surprising result suggested by the RD estimator – that 
schools respond to each additional dollar of Pell Grant aid by increasing institutional aid – I test 
how robust my main results are to difference specifications by varying the window and 
polynomial in CFE
~
to confirm that this result is not an artifact of a particular specification (Table 
1.5). I use three windows of standardized ECF: 000,10
~ CFE ,  4000,4000~ CFE , and 
 3000,3000~ CFE .23 For each window, I include up to a third degree polynomial in 
standardized EFC and use the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal 
degree of polynomial. For all but the largest window, a linear term in standardized EFC provides 
the best fit to the data. Results are consistent across windows and polynomials in CFE
~
. 
1.6 A Framework for Understanding Differences in RK and RD Estimates 
Would a profit-maximizing firm ever pass-through more than 100 percent of a subsidy to 
consumers? When firms have market power, the economic incidence of a tax or subsidy may 
exceed 100 percent, but a simple model suggests that my result would not occur without very 
specific patterns of student demand or a departure from profit-maximization.  
                                                 
23 The largest window encompasses students with an AGI ranging from $0 to approximately $90,000, the second 
window includes families whose AGI falls between $20,000 and $60,000, and the smallest window restricts the 
analysis to families with an AGI between $25,000 and $50,000. 
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First, suppose a profit-maximizing monopolist serving N distinct student groups solves: 






max   
where Qi is the demand of students in group i and c is the marginal cost of serving an additional 
student. For simplicity, I assume marginal costs are constant, both in the number of students 
served and across student groups, which is reasonable if instruction and facilities make up the 
majority of expenses. The school charges students in group i a price that is equal to overall 
tuition (which does not vary across groups) minus institutional aid (which may vary across 
groups). Groups are defined by students observable characteristics (e.g., demographic 
characteristics, EFC), and schools use these characteristics to practice price discrimination. This 
is a static problem, where a school’s behavior in the current period does not affect cost or 
demand in future periods.  













  and ie is the price elasticity of demand for students in group i. When federal need-
based aid (s) is introduced, the school charges   ii scp  , where ics  . The change in the 
final price paid by students in group i in response to the subsidy will be: 







i       
For instance, 0
ds
dpi  indicates that the school fully captures every additional dollar of the 
subsidy, while 1
ds
dpi  indicates subsidies are fully passed-through to students. The sign of 
ds
dpi  
depends on both the elasticity and the curvature of the demand function for students in group i 
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(Bulow and Pfleiderer 1983; Weyl and Fabinger 2011). If demand is log-concave, 1
ds
dpi , and 
schools capture a portion of students’ Pell Grant aid by increasing prices (decreasing institutional 
aid).24 If demand is log-convex, 1
ds
dpi , and schools respond to Pell Grant aid by decreasing 
prices (increasing institutional aid), the result suggested by the RD estimator. 25 
However, the increase in institutional aid combined with the change in the slope of the 
institutional aid-EFC schedule at the threshold, with institutional transfers decreasing with every 
additional dollar of Pell Grant aid, is more surprising. If student demand is log-convex, then 
institutional transfers should increase as Pell Grant aid increases. There would have to be sharp 
changes in the demand functions of students near the eligibility threshold to account for the 
patterns of institutional aid provision I observe. Specifically, the initial $400 Pell Grant award 
would have to move students from a log-concave portion of the demand curve to a log-convex 
portion, requiring the existence of an inflection point. This is unlikely, since the eligibility 
threshold for Pell Grant aid changes over time, while pricing patterns are persistent (results 
available upon request). 
Conversely, suppose a subset of schools have a different objective function, and 
maximize weighted student enrollment, where weights vary across student groups: 
                                                 
24 The price set by a school has two components: tuition and institutional aid:
ii atp  . Since schools set tuition 




dp ii  . 
 
25 In the short-run, this model can be easily generalized to represent institutional pricing with monopolistically 
competitive firms offering differentiated products. In this case, student demand will depend not only on an 
institution’s price but the prices offered by competitors,  ijiii ppQQ  , , and pricing will also depend on the cross-
price elasticities of demand. Pass-through will be decreasing in the number of competitors in the market and the 
degree of substitutability between programs offered by institutions. In the long-run, incidence will depend on the 
ease of entry into a specific market. Additionally, a substantial minority of institutions are monopolists. In 2009, 17 
percent of all institutions eligible to disburse federal aid were the only institution in their county. 
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The constraint stems from the requirement that in a static model, expenditures cannot exceed 
revenue. If the constraint is binding, schools will offer a schedule of prices that vary by demand 
elasticity as well as the weight placed on the group in the schools objective function ( i ) and the 
marginal “utility” of revenue (represented by the Lagrange multiplier):   iii cp ~ , where 
i
~  is the weight on students in group i divided by the Lagrange multiplier. If being labeled as a 
Pell Grant recipient affects this weight, schools’ pricing response to subsidy s is now:  



















Equation (1.9) implies that if Pell Grant recipients receive a positive weight in the 
school’s objective function (e.g.,   0~ si ), the second term will be smaller than in the case of 
static profit maximization. Furthermore, if Pell Grant recipients’ weights are larger than those of 




d i ), the first 
term will be larger. If either of these terms is positive, these schools will capture a smaller 
portion of Pell Grant aid. Furthermore, rearranging equation (1.9): 



































Here the first term represents the pass-through of outside student aid due to profit maximization 
(or cost minimization), while the second term accounts for a school’s willingness to pay for Pell 







vary with s for Pell Grant recipients (e.g., if being a Pell Grant recipient increases your weight in 
the school’s objective function by a constant amount), the relationship between the prices for 
group i students and Pell Grant aid can be approximated by:   iiii ussp  10 0  1 . Here, pi 
is the final price faced by students in group i, 0 and 1 represent willingness to pay for Pell 
Grant recipients and pass-through of each additional dollar of Pell Grant aid, respectively, and ui 
is an idiosyncratic error term.26 
There are a number of reasons why schools might treat Pell Grant recipients differently 
than other students. First, schools might have objectives beyond profit maximization, such as 
increasing school-wide diversity or maximizing (weighted) student welfare. Schools might solve 
a dynamic problem where additional Pell Grant recipients in the current period increase the 
expected value of the stream of future revenue (or reduce the expected value of the stream of 
future costs). For example, schools that serve a larger number of Pell Grant recipients might 
receive more funding from state legislatures in the long-run or experience an increase in student 
demand. For instance, in recent years, the U.S. News and World Report began incorporating a 
measure of Pell Grant receipt in its school ranking calculations. For the purposes of this paper, I 
remain agnostic as to the reasons schools might treat Pell Grant recipients differently from 
students who barely miss the cut-off for eligibility.  
1.6.1  Estimating the Multiple Treatment Dimensions of Pell Grant Receipt 
Equation (1.10) suggests that the “treatment” of receiving a Pell Grant affects prices 
along two dimensions: a school’s willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients ( 0 ) and ability to 
appropriate outside aid due to the pass-through of cost decreases ( 1 ). To see how these two 
                                                 
26 This approximation also assumes that in the neighborhood of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold, each additional 
dollar of Pell Grant aid does not lead to large changes in the log-curvature of demand.  
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dimensions are related to RD and RK estimates, consider a simplified version of equation (1.6), 
the reduced form impact of Pell Grant eligibility on institutional aid in a specific school and year:  
           iiiiii CFECFECFECFEy   ~~0~0~ 11  
Furthermore, assume that all eligible students receive a Pell Grant, where the minimum award is 
$400 (e.g., “sharp” RD/RK).  
The RD design provides a reduced form estimate of the “treatment” of Pell Grant receipt, 





 RD , which confounds the school’s ability to capture an 
additional dollar of outside aid with its willingness to pay for students labeled as Pell Grant 
recipients (see Appendix). When these two dimensions have opposite signs, RD estimates will 
not identify the magnitude and sign of either dimension.  
The RK design will consistently estimate the pass-through of an additional dollar of 
outside aid, under the assumption that 1 is constant in the neighborhood of the cut-off for Pell 
Grant eligibility (see Appendix). Since 1 RK  and the RK/RD design is fuzzy: 











Where  0efcPell  is the minimum Pell Grant award, RD̂  and RK̂ are the RD and RK estimators, 
respectively, 0̂  is the estimated willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients, and 1̂ is the pass-
through of Pell Grant aid from the student to the school. The appendix provides further details 
for the derivation of these parameters.  
Table 1.6 presents estimates of the capture and willingness to pay parameters for the 
pooled sample (Panel A) and by sector (Panel B). I use the delta method to calculate standard 
errors. Across all institutions, estimated pass-through is 0.22, suggesting institutions receive 22 
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cents of every additional dollar of Pell Grant aid. However, due to schools’ willingness to pay for 
Pell Grant recipients, Pell Grant recipients experience a $260 increase in institutional aid. Since 
students ineligible for Pell Grants received $1,800 in institutional aid on average (including 
students that did not receive any institutional aid), this transfer represents a 14 percent increase in 
the expected value of institutional aid.27 However, only Pell Grant recipients near the eligibility 
threshold benefit from these transfers, and these students make up less than a third of all 
recipients. For the remainder of Pell Grant recipients, schools’ ability to capture Pell Grant aid 
outweighs willingness to pay for needy students.   
Figures 1.10A through 1.10C suggest that pass-through Pell Grant aid and willingness to 
pay for Pell Grant recipients vary across sectors. I test for differences in behavior by fully 
interacting Pellit with a vector of indicators for the different sectors of higher education. Private 
institutions do not demonstrate a willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients and 13 to 15 cents 
of every Pell Grant dollar is passed-through from students to nonselective institutions. 
Conversely, public schools increase institutional aid for recipients by $300 to $600 in public 
schools. The difference in willingness to pay between selective and nonselective public schools 
is only marginally significant. This additional aid represents a 140 percent increase in the 
expected value of institutional grants among nonselective public school students and a 90 percent 
increase for selective public school students.28  
While public schools appropriate 17 to 18 cents of every Pell Grant dollar, pass-through 
of Pell Grant aid is the largest among selective nonprofit institutions. These schools capture 69 
                                                 
27 This calculation includes students within $10,000 of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold. However, if I limit the 
distance to be $4,000, estimated institutional aid is quite similar ($1850). 
 
28 On average, Pell ineligible students receive approximately $230 in institutional aid from nonselective public 




cents every Pell Grant dollar, while any willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients is quickly 
overtaken. This result suggests that selective nonprofits either serve students with less elastic 
demand or have greater market power. 
1.6.2  Heterogeneity by Student and Market Characteristics 
To determine whether differences in student demand can explain differences in pass-
through between sectors, I examine heterogeneity in pass-through and schools willingness to pay 
for Pell Grant recipients across three student demographic groups, defined by race (white versus 
nonwhite), dependency status, and gender (Table 1.7). If students with similar characteristics 
have relatively similar demand elasticities, this analysis provides a test of whether the greater 
degree of pass-through in the selective nonprofit sector stems from differences in the demand of 
the students these schools serve. Specifically, if selective nonprofits serve a segment of the 
market is with less elastic demand, pass-through will be greater without any differences in these 
schools’ underlying objectives.  
I find that across all demographic groups, pass-through of Pell Grant aid in the selective 
nonprofit sector is significantly greater than in other sectors, except in the case of independent 
students.29 Additionally, public schools display a willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients 
across all groups. These results suggest that differences in the characteristics of students served 
cannot fully explain selective nonprofit institutions’ large degree of capture or public schools’ 
valuation of students receiving Pell Grant aid.  
Measuring schools’ market power is a more difficult task. I measure the ex ante degree of 
competition in a school’s market using a Herfindahl index of institutional shares of the 
                                                 
29 In independent students in all sectors experience the smallest degree of crowd-out, suggesting these students have 
more elastic demand than dependent students. 
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undergraduate population during the prior academic year. I define the market served by a 
particular institution to be the county in which it is located, since the median distance a student 
travels to attend a nonselective institution is 15 miles (Horn and Nevill 2006), and use data from 
the IPEDS to measure the total number of undergraduate full-time equivalent (FTE) students in a 
county and institutional shares for NPSAS and non-NPSAS schools.30 Although some selective 
schools effectively serve a national market, I find evidence that Pell Grant receipt causes some 
students to switch from attending nonselective schools to selective institutions, suggesting 
students may be evaluating their choices in their local market.  
To test whether pass-through varies by market structure, I create a dichotomous measure 
of concentration based on the index (H>0.25) and estimate equation (1.11), fully 
interacting itPell ,  0~ itCFE1 , and    iit CFECFE ~0~ 1  with this measure. Table 1.8 displays 
these results (estimates of willingness to pay by market concentration are available upon 
request). In column 2, I consider all other institutions when constructing the index; in column 3, I 
only consider institutions with similar selectivity (e.g., assuming that selective nonprofit schools 
do not compete with for-profit schools for students). I find some evidence that selective 
nonprofit institutions respond to competitors – in markets with few similarly selective schools, 
these institutions capture 79 cents of every Pell Grant dollar, while in more competitive markets, 
only 44 cents of every Pell dollar are passed through. However, my measure of market power is 
blunt and does not account for endogenous entry decisions.  
My results represent the short-run incidence of Pell Grant aid. In the long-run, increases 
in competition may limit schools’ ability to capture student aid. Although the supply of public 
                                                 
30 Unfortunately, prior to 2000, the IPEDS data files do not accurately represent the presence of for-profit 
institutions among the set of schools eligible to disburse federal student aid. However, as shown in column 1 of 
Table 1.9, estimates of pass-through are quite similar for this truncated sample.  
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institutions is relatively fixed, Cellini (2010) shows that student aid increases lead to for-profit 
entry. If for-profit institutions retain captured Pell Grant aid as profits, my results provide a 
rationale for this response. An increase in number of schools should reduce the ability of schools 
to capture Pell Grant aid and in the long-run, institutional capture should be driven to zero. 
Incidence analysis in this case is complicated by the fact that captured Pell Grant funds in the 
present period ultimately lead to an expansion provision of higher education. Although current 
Pell recipients lose out, new students, who would not have otherwise attended college, will gain 
from the ability of schools to capture Pell aid. However, the market for higher education also has 
substantial barriers to entry, since schools face large fixed costs (e.g., investments in facilities). 
Schools also must gain accreditation and demonstrate a sufficiently high level of enrollment for 
two years before their students are eligible for Pell Grant aid.  
1.6.3  Evaluating Alternate Explanations for Institutional Pricing 
  Thus far, I have attributed differences in institutional pricing responses to Pell Grant aid 
to differences in institutional objectives and market power. However, there are other potential 
explanations for this behavior. First, differences in unmet need and institutional policies across 
sectors could potentially explain differences in estimated crowd-out. For instance, since public 
schools charge significantly lower prices than private institutions, institutional aid may 
mechanically fall if increases in Pell Grant aid reduce students’ unmet need to zero. State need-
based aid may be distributed differently across sectors, also contributing to this effect. Figures 
1.12 and 1.13 explore this possibility and plot the percentage of students with any unmet need 
and average unmet need and by EFC and sector, where unmet need is defined as the difference 
between a student’s cost of attendance and her expected family contribution, Pell Grant and other 
federal grant aid, and state grant aid. Across all sectors, over 90 percent of students near the Pell 
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Grant eligibility threshold had remaining unmet need, and on average, these students faced an 
additional $10,000 in expected education-related expenses that are not covered by federal or state 
grant aid. Even students attending nonselective public institutions –schools with the lowest cost 
of attendance – had substantial remaining need. 
 Second, students may respond to Pell Grant generosity by upgrading to a higher quality 
institution. In this case, price increases would be expected, as students are receiving a more 
valuable product. Although I find some evidence of sorting across sectors at the eligibility 
threshold – with a small, discrete increase in the probability of attending a selective institution as 
the eligibility threshold is crossed – there is no evidence of a kink. Since selectivity is just one 
dimension of school quality, I also test for evidence of quality upgrading by examining 
institutional revenue, expenditures, and the outcomes of former students. I use information from 
the IPEDS linked to NPSAS institutions to create measures of revenue and expenditures, 
including tuition and total revenue per full-time equivalent (FTE) student and institutional grants, 
instruction-related expenditures, and expenditures on student services per FTE.31 Finally, I use 
the Department of Education’s official cohort default rate, which measures the proportion of 
individuals defaulting on their federal loans within the two years, to measure the outcomes of 
former students.  
I little evidence of upgrading along any of these measures of school quality and in many 
cases, find evidence of a negative relationship between Pell Grant generosity and school quality 
(Table 1.9). I estimate a positive relationship between Pell Grant aid and expenditures on 
institutional grants and instruction for students attending public schools, but the magnitudes of 
                                                 
31 I use prior-year revenue and expenditure data to create these measures. Unfortunately, the IPEDS only began 
collected revenue and expenditure data for the majority of schools in 2000, thus, when examining these measures of 
quality, my sample is limited to students attending institutions in 2004 and 2008. 
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these effects are quite small. A $1000 increase in Pell Grant aid is correlated with a $14 (1 
percent) increase in institutional grants/FTE offered by nonselective public schools. For selective 
public schools, a $1000 increase in Pell Grant aid is correlated with a $22 (1 percent) increase in 
institutional aid and a $132 (2 percent) increase in instruction-related expenditures for students 
attending selective public schools. Pell Grant aid is negatively correlated with student loan 
default rates in the for-profit sector, where a $1000 increase in Pell Grant aid is correlated with a 
0.9 percentage point reduction in the default rate of graduating students. However, among 
students attending selective nonprofit institutions – the sector which shows the highest degree of 
crowd-out – there is no evidence of quality upgrading. 
1.7 Incidence Across All Pell Grant Recipients 
So far, I have only focused on estimating the incidence of Pell Grant aid in the neighborhood of 
the cut-off for Pell Grant eligibility. With stronger assumptions, I can use the observable 
relationship between institutional aid and EFC for ineligible students to estimate the incidence of 
the Pell Grant program across all students. Specifically, I assume that the relationship between 
institutional aid and EFC for ineligible students provides a valid counterfactual for what the 
relationship between institutional aid and EFC would have been for Pell Grant recipients in the 
absence of the Pell Grant Program. For this approach to work, heterogeneous treatment effects 
must be linear. Specifically, the pass-through of Pell Grant aid and schools’ willingness to pay 
for Pell Grant recipients must be constant in the amount of Pell Grant aid 
Figure 1.14 provides an illustration of my approach. The shaded area under the Pell Grant 
curve represents the total amount of aid directed towards Pell Grant recipients by the federal 
government. The solid lines represent the observed relationship between institutional aid and 
EFC for eligible and ineligible students, while the dashed line represents counterfactual 
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institutional aid for eligible students in the absence of the Pell Grant Program. In other words, 
each point along this line represents the amount of institutional aid a student with a particular 
EFC would have received had the Pell Grant Program not existed. The difference between the 
area under the first curve (counterfactual institutional aid) and the second curve (actual 




, represents the percentage of Pell Grant aid captured by institutions, and is also 
the average treatment effect of Pell Grants on institutional aid.  
Across all sectors, every dollar of Pell Grant aid reduces students’ effective prices by 84 
cents, with institutions appropriating the remaining 16 cents through price discrimination (Table 
1.10). Nonselective private institutions, a category encompassing nonprofit and for-profit 
schools, receive 18 cents of every Pell Grant dollar while selective nonprofit institutions capture 
79 cents. In the public sector, net crowd-out of Pell Grant aid is close to zero; the point estimate 
is small and only marginally insignificant. However, this result masks important heterogeneity – 
transfers to students close to the eligibility threshold are offset by decreases in institutional aid 
for the neediest Pell Grant recipients (Figure 1.10A).  
1.8 Conclusions 
Although low-income students are the statutory recipients of Pell Grant aid, they do not receive 
the full benefit of these subsidies. Using a combined regression discontinuity and regression kink 
approach, I estimate the impact of Pell Grants on institutional aid. I show that schools 
strategically respond to changes in federal need-based aid by systematically altering the 
distribution of institutional aid. Overall, I estimate that institutions capture 16 percent of all Pell 
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Grant aid. However, this result masks important variation in pass-through across sectors and 
across students with different levels of need.  
RK and RD designs yield conflicting estimates of the impact of Pell Grant aid on college 
pricing, with RK estimates suggesting schools capture Pell Grant aid and the RD estimator 
implying schools supplement Pell Grants with increased institutional aid. I show that these 
disparate estimates can be reconciled using a framework in which schools place different weights 
on students with different characteristics. In this case, the “treatment” of Pell Grant aid has two 
dimensions: the additional dollar of outside aid that the school would like to capture and the 
school’s willingness to pay for Pell Grant recipients.  
Through a combined RD/RK approach, I separately identify schools’ willingness to pay 
for students categorized as needy and the pricing response to outside subsidies. The RD design 
only identifies the reduced form impact of these two dimensions, and for RD estimates, schools’ 
willingness to pay dominates their ability to capture outside aid. Using the combined RD/RK 
approach, I estimate that less than one third of Pell Grant recipients benefit from these transfers, 
since schools’ ability to capture Pell Grant aid quickly overtakes their willingness to pay for 
needy students. My paper is the first to combine RD and RK estimators to distinguish between 
different treatment dimensions.  
The Pell Grant Program provides an especially stark example of how a multidimensional 
treatment affects RD estimates. However, in other circumstances where both a discontinuity and 
a kink are present, my results suggest that additional information is present in the kink, and this 
information may provide insight into the channels through which the “treatment” of interest 
works. In a number of the studies cited by Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) survey on the RD design 
that examine the impact of a continuous endogenous regressor, the deterministic relationship 
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between the endogenous regressor and assignment variable leads to both a discontinuity and a 
kink. For instance, in cases where a minimum class size rule leads to a discontinuous relationship 
between total enrollment and class size (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 1999; Hoxby 2000; Urquiola 
2006), this rule creates both a discontinuity and a kink.32 If, for instance, the creation of an 
additional classroom leads to smaller classes and sorting of children by achievement, behavior, 
or some other dimension (e.g., Lazear 2001), the discontinuity and the kink could potentially be 
used to separately analyze the influence of these dimensions on educational outcomes.  
My paper also provides insight into the industrial organization of higher education. I 
show how schools’ responses to Pell Grant aid illustrate differences in schools’ objectives and 
market power across sectors. Public schools demonstrate a positive willingness to pay for Pell 
Grant recipients. Overall, selective nonprofit institutions capture close to 80 percent of their 
students’ Pell Grants. Across different student demographic groups, I estimate a similar degree 
of capture students attending selective nonprofits, suggesting these schools’ extensive ability to 
appropriate Pell Grant aid stems from a greater degree of market power rather than differences in 
student demand. Although the net crowd-out of Pell Grants in the public sector is close to zero, 
increases in institutional aid for recipients near the eligibility threshold come at the expense of 
the neediest Pell recipients.  
Finally, I find no evidence that for-profit institutions behave differently than other 
nonselective schools in the private sector in their response to Pell Grant aid, and combined, 
schools in this sector capture just 17 percent of their students’ Pell Grant aid. However, in many 
                                                 
32 For example, if the rule mandates a maximum class size of N , when enrollment reaches 1N , average class size 
changes discontinuously from N  to 
2
1N . This rule also leads to a kink in the relationship between average class 
size and total enrollment. When enrollment is less than N , the slope of relationship between class size and total 
enrollment is 1. When class size is greater than N , but less than N2 , the slope of the relationship between class size 
and total enrollment is 0.5.  
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for-profit institutions, the majority of students receive Pell Grants. It may be easiest for these 
institutions to benefit from Pell Grant generosity by raising the list price of tuition. Consistent 
with this view, Cellini and Goldin (2012) show that in the for-profit sector, schools eligible to 
distribute federal student aid charge a list price that is 75 percent higher than ineligible schools 
with similar characteristics. 
Under the stronger assumption that the distribution of institutional aid to ineligible 
students near the threshold provides a valid counterfactual for the distribution of institutional aid 
in the absence of the Pell Grant Program, I calculate that schools capture 16 percent of all Pell 
Grant aid. In 2011, the federal government distributed $35 billion in Pell Grants to 9.5 million 




1.9 Appendix: Regression Discontinuity Estimation with a Multidimensional Treatment 
In this appendix, I provide a general example of how a multidimensional treatment will affect 
regression discontinuity (RD) design estimates. Additionally, I show how using a regression kink 
(RK) design, in combination with a RD design, allows estimation of more than one treatment 
dimension. Finally, I show how this approach is applied in the case of the Pell Grant Program.  
 Let Y be the outcome of interest, where  UXTyY ,,  and T is the “treatment” of 
interest and is continuous and potentially endogenous. X and U are covariates, where X is 
observable, U is unobservable, and both are determined prior to T. Finally, T is a deterministic 
function of X,   XtT  , and the data generating processes for Y and T are: 
(B1)         UXgTfY  ,  
(B2)         XhxXXxXT  0100 11   
Where  Xh  is continuously differentiable in the neighborhood of 0x . In this case, the 
deterministic relationship between T and X leads to both a change in the level and in the first 
derivative of T at 0x . I assume that treatment effects do not vary with X or U, but this assumption 
could be relaxed without affecting my main conclusions. Finally,  uFU is the cdf of U and 
 uxF UX ||  is the conditional cdf of X.  
Under the following identifying assumptions, the RD estimator will approximate random 
assignment (Hahn et al. 2001; Lee and Lemieux 2010): 
RD1 (Regularity):  uxty ,,  is continuous in x in the neighborhood of 0x  and   00 xfU . 
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RD2 (First Stage):   T is a known function, continuous on  0, x  and  ,0x , but  





RD3 (Continuous conditional density of the assignment variable):  uxf UX ||  is continuous 
in x in the neighborhood of 0x  for every u. This condition means that observations have 
imperfect control over X and rules out sorting in response to the treatment. 
Consider two different forms of  ,Tf : 
(B3)       TTf 1,    
(B4)      TTTf 10 ]0[1,    
If equation (B3) describes  ,Tf , “treatment” has a single dimension, as is generally assumed in 
RD designs, the RD estimator equals: 
   
   


























  .  
To see this, note that the numerator of the RD estimator is equal to: 




xX|UXgTTElim-xX|UXgTTElim 1010 ]0[1]0[1  
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xX|XhElimxX|XhElim  by assumption, the RD numerator is 
equal to  01010 x   and the RD estimator equals: 













Thus, when the treatment has more than one dimension, the RD estimator only recovers 
the reduced form impact of these dimensions. In this case, with the RD design alone, it is not 
possible to separately identify 0  and 1 . However, since the deterministic relationship between T 
and X  leads to both a discontinuous change in the level and a discontinuous change in the slope 
of T at 0x , it is possible to separately identify these dimensions using a combined RD and RK 
approach.  
In addition to the RD identifying assumptions, the RK design requires the following 







 is continuous in x in the neighborhood of 0x .
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RK2 (First Stage):   T is continuously differentiable on  0, x  and  ,0x , but  


















                                                 




 ,, is continuous in t. If treatment is 
multidimensional, this condition is violated. Comparisons of RD and RK estimators allows for a test of whether this 
condition is met. 
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RD3 (Continuously differentiable conditional density of the assignment variable): 
 uxf UX ||  is continuously differentiable in x in the neighborhood of 0x  for every u.  
If these conditions are met, regardless of whether  ,Tf  is represented by equation (B3) 
or (B4), the RK estimator equals: 
   
   







































To see this, first note that the numerator equals: 



















By assumptions RK1 and RK3, 






































, regardless of the value of 0 , and  

















, by assumption.  Thus, the RK numerator 
equals 
























 and the RK estimator equals: 
(B6)     1 RK  
Furthermore, if the treatment has two dimensions, as described in equation (B4), the RD 
and RK estimators can be combined to identify both 0  and 1 . The RK estimator identifies 1 , 
and combining (B5) and (B6) allows for identification of the second treatment dimension: 
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(B7)       00 xTRKRD     




0 ...  ppRD xTxTxT


  and 
    10021 ...  ppRK xTxT  where p is the order of the polynomial in T. Thus, using a 
combined RD/RK approach, it is always possible to identify 0 , or the discrete change in the 
outcome that occurs when 0T , but it is not possible to separately recover higher order terms 
without discontinuities in higher order derivatives of T. 
B.1 Identification of multiple treatment dimensions in the case of the Pell Grant Program 
 In the case of the Pell Grant Program,  UEFCPellyY ,,  represents institutional aid. 
Since not every student submits an application for federal aid, Pell Grant aid is not completely 
determined by a student’s EFC, and the RD/RK designs will be fuzzy. The data generating 
processes for Y and Pell are: 
(B8)        UEFCgPellfY  ,  
(B9)       00 400 efcEFCefcEFCPell  1  
Where 0efc is the cut-off for Pell Grant eligibility, and  1,0  (e.g., the probability a student 
applies for federal aid) is a random variable where   efcE  0 . Although may also depend on 
EFC, since the decision to apply is determined prior to an individual receives their Pell Grant 
award, I assume that  EFC   is continuous and smooth in the neighborhood of 0efc . 
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 My model suggests that Pell Grant aid may affect institutional aid provision through two 
dimensions: by altering a school’s willingness to pay  0 and through schools’ ability to capture 
outside aid due to the pass-through of demand increases  1 : 
(B10)         PellPellPellf 10 0,   1  
The numerator of the RD estimator will be equal to: 









efcEFC|UEFCgElimefcEFC|UEFCgElim ,  
by assumptions RD1 and RD3, the RD numerator is equal to: 








efcEFC|PellPellElimefcEFC|PellPellElim 1010 00 11  
      
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Then the RD estimator is equal to: 
  
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  , where   4000 efcPell . Following the 
arguments presented in the previous section, and assuming that  ,Pellf  does not include any 







1.10 Figures and Tables 
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Figure 1.2: The Maximum Pell Grant Award as a Percentage of the Average Cost of Attendance 
1980: Max Pell = $4950 (64% of COA)































































































































0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Expected Family Contribution
2008 2004 2000 1996
 
Notes: Each line represents the statutory Pell Grant award a full-time, full-year student with a 
given EFC would receive in the years covered by the NPSAS. All dollar amounts are nominal.  
 




































-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Note: $50 EFC bins. Markers represent average Pell Grant Award received by students in bin.
 
 Notes: $50 EFC bins. Each marker represents the average Pell Grant received by students in the bin. 
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Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold




Change in level (institutional grant aid) = 0  
Change in slope (institutional grant aid) = 0 
Change in slope (Pell) = B 
Change in level (Pell) = A 
Change in level  
(institutional grant aid) = - A 
Change in slope  
(institutional aid) = - B 
Change in level (Pell) = A 
Change in slope (Pell) = B 
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-2000 -1000 0 1000 2000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
 
Notes: $100 EFC bins. Estimated discontinuity (McCrary test) = 0.028 (0.041).   
Estimated change in slope = -0.113 (0.083). 
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A. Race
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-2000 -1000 0 1000 2000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Discontinuity estimate = 0.146 (0.141). Estimated change in slope = -0.000004 (0.000001).
E. For-profit
 
Notes: $100 EFC bins.  
 





































-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Pell Grants Institutional Grants
 
Notes: $200 EFC bins. The black solid line represents a linear fit of institutional grant aid on 
EFC, estimated separately on each side of the cut-off; gray dashed lines are 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The thin black dashed line is a linear fit of Pell Grant aid on EFC. Larger 
circles indicate a larger number of students within the EFC bin. 
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Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
 
Notes: $200 EFC bins. The black solid line represents a local linear fit of institutional grant aid 
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-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Pell Grants Institutional Grants
B. Nonselective Nonprofit Institutions
 
Notes: $250 EFC bins. The black solid line represents a linear fit of institutional grant aid on 
EFC, estimated separately on each side of the cut-off; gray dashed lines are 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The black dashed line is an extension of the linear fit of Pell Grant aid on 
EFC for Pell ineligible students. Larger circles indicate a larger number of students. 
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-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Pell Grants Institutional Grants
C. Selective Nonprofit Institutions
 
Notes: $250 EFC bins. The black solid line represents a linear fit of institutional grant aid on 
EFC, estimated separately on each side of the cut-off; gray dashed lines are 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The black dashed line is an extension of the linear fit of Pell Grant aid on 
EFC for Pell ineligible students. Larger circles indicate a larger number of students. 
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A. Nonselective Public B. Selective Public C. Nonselective Nonprofit







Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
 
 






































































































































































































Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
 
Notes: Unmet need equals a student’s cost of attendance minus her EFC, Pell Grant and other 
federal grant aid, and state grant aid.   
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Distance from Pell Grant Eligibility Threshold
Pell Grant Observed Institutional Grants
 
Notes: The area labeled Total Pell represents the total amount of Pell Grant aid disbursed to students. The 
areas A and B represent the difference between the area below the counterfactual institutional grant aid-
EFC relationship (represented by the dashed line) and the actual institutional grant aid-EFC relationship for 
Pell eligible students (represented by the solid line); A-B represents the amount of institutional grant aid 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First Stage Reduced Form IV (RK) IV (RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in slope -0.699 0.153
(0.007)** (0.031)**
Change in level 397.74 128.45
(12.52)** (42.55)**
Pell Grant Aid -0.219 0.323
(0.044)** (0.106)**
F-test of excluded instrument(s) 7928 1132
Over-id test (p-value)
Observations 133,270 133,270 133,270 133,270
Table 1.4: RK and RD Estimates of the Impact of Pell Grant Generosity on Institutional Aid
Data: 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS. Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Number
of observations rounded to nearest 10. Standard errors clustered at institution level in parentheses; **
p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Pell Grants and instituional grants in constant 2011$. All regressions include
year and school fixed effects, linear and quadratic terms in age, and indicators for gender, race, fall
attendance status, enrollment length, level, dependency status, out-of-state student, and a quadratic in
student expected family contribution (EFC - kt, where kt is the threshold for Pell Grant eligibility in year t ).
In column 3, 1[EFC < kt] instruments for Pell Grant Aid. In column 4, (EFC - kt)*1[EFC<kt] instruments
for Pell Grant Aid. Students with EFC greater than 10,000 from Pell Grant eligibility thresold are excluded.
0.000
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Polynomial of IV (RK) IV (RD)
Order: (1) (2)






Optimal Degree 2 2
Observations 133,270 133,270






Optimal Degree 1 1
Observations 87,290 87,290






Optimal Degree 1 1
Observations 62,420 62,420
Data: 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS. Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Number of
observations rounded to nearest 10. Standard errors clustered at institution level in parentheses; ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05, + p<0.1; Pell Grants and instituional grants in constant 2011$. All regressions include year and school
fixed effects, linear and quadratic terms in age, and indicators for gender, race, fall attendance status, enrollment
length, level, dependency status, out-of-state student, and a up to a third degree polynominal in student expected
family contribution (EFC - kt, where kt is the threshold for Pell Grant eligibility in year t). The optimal degree of
polynomial for each bandwidth is determined using the minimum Akaike Information Criteria. RD estimates
instrument for Pell Grant aid with 1[EFC < kt]; RK estimates instrument with (EFC - kt)*1[EFC < kt]. 
Table 1.5: Robustness of RK and RD Estimates of the Impact of Pell Grant Generosity on
Institutional Aid to Varying Bandwidths and Polynomials
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Pass-Through Willingness to Pay




Public Nonselective -0.179 318.3
(0.017)** (63.31)**
Public Selective -0.173 618.9
(0.032)** (101.5)**
Nonprofit Nonselective -0.154 -193.3
(0.060)* (216.6)





Table 1.6: The Impact of Pell Grant Generosity on Institutional Aid, Treatment Dimensions
Data: 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS. Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate
regression. Number of observations rounded to nearest 10. Standard errors clustered at institution
level in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Pell Grants and instituional grants in constant
2011$. All regressions include year and school fixed effects, linear and quadratic terms in age, and
indicators for gender, race, fall attendance intensity, enrollment length, level, dependency status, out-
of-state student, and a linear term in student expected family contribution. Panel A also includes a
quadratic in EFC. Students with EFC greater than 10,000 from Pell Grant cut-off are excluded. See



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Grants Instruction Student Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All Sectors
Mean of depvar $10,619 $19,038 $1,061 $6,214 $5,748 6.55
* Pell Grant Aid -0.027 -0.030 0.004 -0.035 0.008 0.0003
(0.142) (0.198) (0.015) (0.060) (0.072) (0.0001)**
Observations 66,950 77,470 66,940 83,810 84,630 128,800
B. By Sector
Nonselective Public
Mean of depvar $5,160 $13,629 $1,086 $5,051 $3,828 8.2
* Pell Grant Aid -0.089 -0.153 0.014 -0.023 -0.047 -0.0001
(0.040)* (0.074)* (0.008)+ (0.024) (0.025)+ (0.00007)
Selective Public
Mean of depvar $7,839 $25,364 $1,495 $8,412 $5,503 4.5
* Pell Grant Aid 0.082 0.070 0.022 0.139 0.034 0.0003
(0.059) (0.170) (0.013)+ (0.064)* (0.036) (0.0001)**
Nonselective Nonprofit
Mean of depvar $15,247 $22,260 $799 $6,138 $7,872 7.1
* Pell Grant Aid -0.043 0.120 0.033 0.008 0.116 0.0001
(0.155) (0.259) (0.030) (0.088) (0.093) (0.0004)
Selective Nonprofit
Mean of depvar $22,449 $32,393 $1,500 $9,489 $10,288 3.2
* Pell Grant Aid 0.088 0.071 0.038 -0.038 0.064 0.0003
(0.175) (0.288) (0.051) (0.097) (0.112) (0.0001)**
For Profit
Mean of depvar $14,409 $15,860 $353 $3,522 $8,545 10.1
* Pell Grant Aid -0.231 -0.277 -0.006 0.022 -0.228 -0.001
(0.133)+ (0.161)+ (0.013) (0.057) (0.156) (0.0003)**
Observations 66,950 77,470 66,940 83,810 84,630 128,800
Table 1.9: RK Estimates of the Impact of Pell Grant Aid on Institution Quality
Data: 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS, 2003 and 2007 IPEDS, Department of Education Official Cohort Default Rates. 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression. Standard errors clustered at institution level in parentheses;
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Columns 1 through 6 include students attending institutions in 2004 and 2008 with revenue or
expenditure information available in prior year IPEDS. Column 6 includes students attending institutions in all years with
information on two-year cohort default rates. Number of observations rounded to nearest 10. Regressions include year fixed




Percent Captured 95% CI
All Institutions 0.163 [0.114, 0.212]
Public Institutions 0.031 [0.002, 0.060]
Nonselective Private Institutions 0.176 [0.062, 0.290]
Selective Nonprofit Institutions 0.787 [0.563, 1.011]
Data: 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 NPSAS. Notes: These estimates assume the observed
institutional aid-EFC relationship for Pell ineligible students is a valid counterfactual for Pell
eligible students in the absence of the Pell Grant Program. The overall percentage of Pell Grant
aid captured by institutions is equal to the ratio of the difference between the area below the
counterfactual Pell Grant-EFC curve and the actual Pell Grant-EFC curve and the overall
transfer of Pell Grant aid to eligible students (refer to section 6 for details).







The Returns to Higher Education for Marginal Students 
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2.1 Introduction 
Public two-year colleges serve an increasingly important role in meeting the growing demand for 
an educated workforce in the United States. The two-year sector of higher education absorbed 
much of the growth in college attendance over the past several decades and students induced to 
go to college by changes in the costs or returns to higher education are more likely to attend a 
two-year institution (Bound et al. 2010). Numerous studies provide evidence of substantial labor 
market returns to community college credits and credentials, with estimated earnings gains as 
high as 13 percent for each year of attendance and 30 percent for associate degree receipt (e.g., 
Kane and Rouse 1995, Jacobson et al. 2005). However, the marginal individual induced to enter 
college by changes in costs or returns may differ substantially from the average college student 
and it is unclear whether these individuals will experience equally large returns from attending a 
two-year institution.  
In this paper, I focus on a group of students who are likely especially constrained in their 
ability to finance college attendance – mothers who are current and former welfare recipients in 
Colorado. Mothers at risk for welfare receipt are especially relevant group given their generally 
low levels of income, education, and limits on lifetime cash assistance. Using information on 
earnings trajectories before and following entry into Colorado’s welfare program and taking 
advantage of variation in pre-existing county policies that affect the cost of college-going for 
several cohorts of women, I estimate medium term impacts of community college attendance, 
credits, and credential receipt on employment and earnings.  
I find that women who are induced to attend college following welfare entry experience 
large and significant earnings gains, however, these effects are primarily driven by credentials 
receipt. Women appear to benefit from all community college credentials, including short-term 
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certificates and career-oriented associate’s degrees; the sole exception to this finding associate of 
arts or general studies degrees. These credentials, while potentially facilitating transfers to a 
four-year program, do not appear to lead to increases in employment or earnings alone.  
My identification strategy uses an event-study framework to deal with concerns of 
selection bias. If college-going women only differ due to unobservable characteristics, such as 
ability or motivation, these estimates will represent the causal impact of higher education on 
labor market outcomes. Consistent with prior studies, my results suggest that women earning 
degrees in health, science, or technical fields experience the largest benefits on the labor market, 
but even those who earn short-term certificates in non-technical fields experience an increase in 
earnings following degree receipt. I document that failure to account for sub-associate 
credentials results in falsely attributing positive earnings gains to college attendance in the 
absence of degree receipt. Measures of educational attainment in most major surveys (e.g., 
decennial census, current population survey) do not include certificate receipt, suggesting the 
large category generally classified as “some college” includes a heterogeneous group of 
individuals.1 
Finally, I use information on direct and indirect costs of college attendance and reliance 
on public assistance to illustrate the potential short-run private and social returns college 
attendance. In the short-run, when foregone earnings and the direct costs of college attendance 
are taken into consideration, the private rate of return to certificates and most degrees is negative, 
providing a rationale as to why so few women complete credentials, even in light of the large 
impacts on earnings in the medium-term. I also find suggestive evidence of small negative (albeit 
marginally significant) impacts on welfare receipt in the short-run.   
                                                
1 For instance, in the 2000 Census, 22 percent of adults belonged to this category. 
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My findings speak to the question of whether state and federal welfare policy should 
support formal human capital development. Both the Obama administration and the Gates 
Foundation have directed substantial attention and funds towards community college.2 
Additionally, community college students are more likely to benefit from increases in federal aid 
generosity. Grant aid provided through the Pell Grant Program, the largest source of need-based 
aid in the United States, grew from $7.2 to $30 billion between 2000 and 2010, with the 
percentage of recipients attending community colleges increasing from 36 to 57 percent.3 My 
results suggest that supports for credential completion are as, if not more important than funding 
directed towards increasing college attendance. 
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 2.2, I discuss the evolution 
of federal welfare policy towards human capital development, while the third section focuses on 
research findings on the returns to the two-year sector of higher education. Section 2.4 discusses 
my data and presents descriptive results, Section 2.5 discusses my primary empirical strategy and 
resulting estimates, and the sixth section concludes.  
2.2 Welfare Policy and Human Capital Development 
Over the past two decades, federal welfare policy has become increasingly less supportive of 
college enrollment for parents receiving cash assistance. Prior to the large federal reforms 
enacted in 1996, welfare recipients’ behavior was relatively unconstrained under the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Attending a post-secondary institution 
                                                
2 The 2010 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act directed $2 billion in competitive grants to community 
colleges while the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included substantial funding for Pell Grants, 
workforce training programs, and work-study funds in community colleges. In October 2010, the Gates Foundation 
launched the Completion by Design program, which will award $35 million in competitive grants to community 
colleges in nine states.  
 
3 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Reports, U.S. Department of Education, 
Office of Postsecondary Education 
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while on welfare was not uncommon prior to welfare reform – one study estimates that 14 
percent of all recipients attended college while on welfare prior to 1996 (London 2006).  
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) made it 
more difficult to receive welfare concurrently with college attendance; the legislation imposed 
work requirements and time limits on welfare recipients, increasing the costs associated with 
post-secondary education by requiring part-time employment or exit from welfare for those 
wishing to attend college full-time. Although states had the option to exempt welfare recipients 
enrolled in college from work requirements in their first two years of receipt, the policy change 
led to a significant reduction in college enrollment for single mothers. Dave et al. (2008) 
estimate that PRWORA decreased the probability of college enrollment by 20 percent among all 
adult mothers. An additional study finds similar impacts on full-time vocational education (Dave 
et al. 2011).  
The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), increased pressure on states to place welfare 
recipients in “employment-related activities”. PROWRA required states to have at least 50 
percent of single parents participating in a specific set of work activities, including paid 
employment, workfare/community service, and education/training. Before DRA, states could 
deduct each percentage point of caseload reduction since 1995 from their work participation rate 
target. Since caseloads declined steeply following PRWORA, for most states, including 
Colorado, this requirement was not binding. DRA reset the base year to 2005. Furthermore, DRA 
Recipients were further limited to a total of 12 lifetime months of education that must be 
combined with another, employment-related activity, essentially limiting individuals to part-time 
college attendance while receiving welfare.  
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DRA reduced concurrent college attendance and cash assistance receipt for women in 
Colorado by over 20 percent. Figure 2.1 plots the percentage of recipients also attending a public 
college in each month prior to and following the policy change, and shows while 9 to 11 percent 
of women were enrolled in college while receiving assistance before the policy change, only 
around 7.5 percent were attending college after the rules were implemented. Conversely, total 
female enrollment in Colorado’s community colleges increased 9 percent between the fall of 
2004 and fall of 2009.4 
Whether low-skill parents at risk for welfare receipt benefit from higher education is an 
open question. The majority of studies that explicitly focus on welfare recipients compare the 
returns to education vs. a “work first” approach (e.g., job search assistance) in terms of income 
and welfare receipt. Earlier evaluations found returns to education and human capital 
development activities to be small or non-existent (e.g., findings from California’s GAIN 
experiment (Riccio and Friedlander 1992; Riccio et al. 1994)); later research illustrated the 
possibility that any earnings increases following education might be slower to appear. For 
instance, Hotz et al. (2006) find that an education-focused approach led to greater long-term 
earnings gains compared to a work-first approach among California welfare recipients. Although 
these studies offer the advantage of randomization, the “treatment” generally includes types of 
education and training activities, including basic skills training, vocational training, and 
community college coursework, with limited information on the amount of time spent in these 
activities and whether training or courses were attended and what, if any, degrees were received. 
 
 
                                                
4 Colorado Department of Higher Education, “Student Headcount by Gender: Colorado Public Two-Year 
Institutions of Higher Education” reports. 
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2.3 Prior Research 
Numerous papers estimate positive returns to both college attendance and credential receipt in 
the two-year sector. Kane and Rouse (1995) find that each year of community college attendance 
is correlated with a 7 percent increase in annual earnings and women who complete two-year 
associate’s degrees earn 30 percent more than high school graduates. However, results from 
cross-sectional studies that compare labor market outcomes across individuals with different 
levels of education at a point in time may be biased by unobservable characteristics that are 
correlated with both the decision to go to college and employment or earnings (Card, 1999). 
Additionally, the data used in these studies does not measure certificate receipt or differentiate 
between academic and nonacademic associate’s degrees. 
One approach used to dealing with this type of selection bias is to use repeated 
observations of earnings and employment for individuals who are employed both before and 
after they enroll in college. With a sufficiently long panel of data, this event study framework 
essentially uses a student’s pre-college earnings as a counterfactual for what she would have 
earned had she not gone to school, eliminating concerns of selection on time-invariant 
characteristics such as ability or motivation. This strategy necessarily excludes “traditional” 
students who matriculate immediately following high school graduation; however, community 
college students increasingly older, non-traditional students. Additional federal workforce 
retraining programs focus their services on older, displaced workers, and among the women in 
my sample who attend college following welfare entry, the average age is 28. 
Jacobson et al. (2005) first use this approach to examine the returns to community college 
enrollment for high tenure, displaced workers. They estimate that each year of college attendance 
leads to a 13 percent increase in women’s earnings. The benefits of community college 
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attendance primarily accrue to individuals who take technical coursework. Their data only 
measures degree receipt and not receipt of credentials, such as short-term certificates, and few 
individuals in their sample remain in college long enough to complete an associate’s degree. 
Along with my paper, Jepsen et al. (2009) produce some of the first estimates of the 
returns to sub-associate credentials that do not rely on cross-sectional variation. Their paper 
focuses on two cohorts of degree-seeking community college students in Kentucky and also uses 
an individual fixed effects approach to deal with selection on unobservables. Because their 
sample only includes college-going individuals, returns are measured relative to the average 
credits earned by drop-outs, rather than relative to no college attendance. Women earnings 
increase by over 50 percent after earning an associate’s degree. Certificates requiring two to 
three semesters of coursework result in similar earnings gains, while the returns to short-term 
certificates are small (4 percent).5  
2.4 Data and Descriptive Results 
My underlying sample consists of adult welfare recipients who entered Colorado’s welfare 
system, Colorado Works, between the third quarter of 2004 and second quarter of 2007. I use 
program data which contains the universe of individuals who received any assistance from 
Colorado’s TANF program (Colorado Works) beginning September 2004. I observe monthly 
welfare receipt between entry and the first quarter of 2010 as well as a variety of characteristics 
including age, race, marital status, number of children, lifetime months of assistance, whether the 
individual is listed as having a disability, and whether she owns a vehicle. Moreover, I observe 
                                                
5 Cellini and Chaudhary (2011) also use an event-study approach to test whether individuals attending private two-
year institutions experience greater returns than those attending public institutions. The authors find similar returns 
to public and private schools – around a 6 percent increase in earnings for each year of attendance and a 15 to 17 
percent increase in earnings for those that earn an associate’s degree. 
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changes in time-varying individual characteristics (e.g., marriages, births, becoming disabled) 
that are likely correlated with both the decision to enroll in college and labor market outcomes.6  
Individuals are linked to information from the Colorado Department of Higher Education 
which covers individuals’ lifetime college attendance, program of study, cost of attendance, 
financial aid, and credit and degree receipt at all public two and four-year colleges in Colorado. I 
convert semesters attended to quarters, with the fall semester corresponding with the fourth 
quarter, winter/spring semester corresponding to first and second quarters, and the summer 
semester corresponding to the third quarter of a year. Individuals are also matched to data on 
quarterly earnings and employment in all covered sectors from the Colorado Department of 
Labor for the 29 quarters between the third quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2010. 
Finally, I merge quarterly county unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local 
Area Unemployment Statistics program to the panel. 
I drop the small number of male recipients and women who were younger than 19 or 
older than 60 at entry. My sample includes the small number women who attended four-year 
institutions, either prior to or following welfare receipt, although my results are robust to 
excluding these individuals. The remaining sample includes unique 29,556 individuals or 
857,124 person-quarter observations.  
2.4.1 Characteristics of Recipients by Post-entry College Attendance 
Table 2.1 displays the characteristics of the women in my sample, distinguishing between 
women who do not enroll in college following welfare entry, women who enroll but did not 
obtain a credential, and credential recipients. The fourth column includes women who were 
already enrolled in college for at least two quarters at entry rather than those who were induced 
                                                
6 Unfortunately, I only observe these time-varying characteristics when individuals are receiving welfare benefits. 
For individuals who leave welfare, I use the last reported value of these characteristics. If individuals leave and 
return to welfare, I smooth the imputation of characteristics between spells.  
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to enter college after entering Colorado’s welfare program (however, their pre-welfare labor 
market attachment is no weaker than that of women in the other groups). College-going women 
are slightly younger, are more likely to own vehicles, and are slightly less likely to be disabled. 
A portion of women in all four groups have attended college in the past. For instance, 34 percent 
of women who attend college and earn a degree following welfare entry enrolled in college for at 
least one semester. Finally, women who are induced to attend college following entry have 
higher pre-welfare earnings and employment, suggesting that estimates that do not account for 
individual effects may be biased upwards. 
The bottom portion of Table 2.1 contains information pertaining to the educational 
attainment and labor market outcomes I examine. Degree recipients earn close to 70 credits after 
welfare entry. The majority of these women earn a short-term vocational certificate, generally 
requiring 15 to 30 credits, or one to two semesters of part-time attendance, 14 percent earn a 
certificate requiring two to three semesters of full-time attendance, and 28 percent earn an 
associate’s degree.7 Associates’ degrees require between 60 and 90 credits of coursework. Associate 
of arts and associate of general studies (AA/AGS) degrees are designed for students who intend to 
transfer to a four-year program, and while these degrees may be awarded in specific areas (e.g., 
agricultural science), the vast majority are liberal arts degrees. Conversely, associate of applied science 
(AAS) degrees are terminal and apply to specific, commonly technical fields. Women who enroll in 
college following entry but do not earn a degree spend less time in school and only earn 19 
credits, on average.  
Not surprisingly, in the initial quarters after entry, college-going women earn less, on 
average, than women who do not attend college. But four years following entry, college 
                                                
7 Common examples of certificates awarded to welfare recipients include real estate, computer information systems, 
emergency medical services, and nurse assistant/home health aid.  
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attendees earn approximately $400 more per quarter than their counterparts who do not attend 
college, while degree recipients earn close to $1000 more. 
2.4.2 Graphical Analysis 
 Figures 2.2 and 2.3 preview my main approach and results. Figure 2.2 graphs unadjusted 
average earnings by quarter, both before and following welfare entry. The black solid line 
indicates individuals who attend college following entry into Colorado Works but do not earn a 
credential following entry (drop-outs), the thick dashed line represents the earnings trajectories 
of degree recipients, and the gray line represents the earnings of women who do not attend 
college prior to or following welfare entry. I exclude women who were already enrolled in 
college at entry (described in the fourth column of Table 2.1). Thin dotted lines represent 95 
percent confidence intervals.  
Figure 2.2 shows an “Ashenfelter dip” in the quarters immediately surrounding entry. All 
sample members experience a decline in earnings in the two to three quarters before and 
following welfare entry. Up to three years after welfare entry, degree recipients have lower 
earnings than other women, likely due to a greater number of quarters spent in college. 
Conversely, drop-outs appear to have much lower foregone earnings, but their earnings gains 
following welfare entry are small. Beginning in the 12th quarter after entry, the earnings of 
degree recipients significantly exceed both the earnings of other groups and their own pre-
welfare earnings, although these gains are imprecisely estimated due to the small group size. 
  Figure 2.3 replicates this exercise, graphing residual earnings from a regression on 
individual fixed effects. The dashed line without a confidence interval represents the average 
quarterly county unemployment rate. The largest earnings gains to degree recipients accrue at the 
end of the sample period, when unemployment is increasing. During this same period, the 
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residual earnings of college drop-outs and women who do not attend college are 
indistinguishable and decline to below pre-entry levels at approximately 18 quarters after entry.  
2.5 Event Study Framework 
Simple regressions of wages on college enrollment will be biased if the decision to attend college 
is correlated with unobservable individual characteristics that affect employment and earnings. 
Selection bias is likely a concern even among welfare recipients; London (2006) shows that pre-
PRWORA women attending college while on welfare had higher test scores and were more 
likely to have a two-year institution in their county of residence.  
To address this concern, I follow an approach similar to Jacobson et al. (2005), taking 
advantage of the fact that I observe earnings for women both before and after welfare receipt and 
college attendance. If selection bias is only driven by time-invariant unobservable characteristics, 
then including an individual fixed effect will deal with the endogeneity of college attendance and 
degree receipt. Essentially, this approach differences out a person-specific mean level of wages 
from observed quarterly wages, using observations of individuals’ wages prior to college 
attendance as a counterfactual for current wages in the absence of college-going. Additionally, I 
include observations of individuals who do not attend college to identify year and quarter fixed 
effects and the impacts of other observable characteristics. The key identifying assumption is that 
there are no time-varying unobservable shocks correlated with education and labor market 
outcomes affect college-going women differentially than other recipients. 
I estimate the following linear regression model:  
(1)  itcohortpostcohortprequarteryearititititiit ttXedcfy   ),(  
where yit is the outcome of interest (i.e., quarterly earnings, probability of employment) for 
individual i in quarter t, αi is an individual-specific fixed effect that controls for time-invariant 
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unobservable qualities, such as ability or motivation, eit is an indicator for whether an individual 
is enrolled in college in quarter t, since individuals may substitute hours of employment for hours 
of school while enrolled, and Xit is a vector of time-varying observable individual 
characteristics.8 I include year, quarter and county fixed effects and a entry cohort specific time 
trend, allowing for a trend break at welfare entry (e.g., cohortpret   is the pre-entry trend); εit is an 
individual-specific error term that is uncorrelated with educational attainment.  
Finally, ),( itit dcf  is a function of credits and credentials received at the end of college 
enrollment; λ identifies the causal effect of education if there are no time varying unobservable 
characteristics correlated both with college attendance and employment/welfare outcomes. I 
examine two specifications of this function. My first specification includes a linear term in 
credits, ignoring any credentials received. In my second specification, I add indicators for degree 
receipt and again include a linear term in credits received interacted with an indicator for not 
having earned a credential:   
d
ddd
ititit DDdcdcf  ]0[1),( 1 , where 
dD is a vector of 
indicator variables for receipt of specific degrees (i.e., certificates, AA/AGS, AAS). This 
specification allows me to test the impacts of college-going on labor-market outcomes for 
women who ultimately drop-out. 
2.5.1  Estimates of the Impacts of College Credits and Credentials on Labor Market Outcomes 
Table 2.2 examines the effect of college attendance and number of credits received on 
wages and employment. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are cross-sectional estimates, while the 
                                                
8 These characteristics include a quadratic term in age, number of children, age of youngest child, vehicle 
ownership, and indicators for months of lifetime welfare receipt (0 months, 1 to 12, 13 to 24, 25 to 59, and 60 or 
more months). These intervals correspond to cut-offs that trigger changes in Colorado welfare rules. For instance, 
two thirds of a participant’s income is disregarded from benefit calculation for the first twelve months of 
participation. After 24 months of assistance, recipients are required to participate in at least 20 hours of work related 
activities per week (e.g., employment, job search, on the job training). Finally, Colorado follows the federal 60 
month lifetime limit on benefit receipt (although some participants are granted extensions for extenuating 
circumstances).  
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remaining columns include individual fixed effects. Quarterly earnings and the probability of 
employment are both increasing in the number of credits earned when I do not account for 
credentials. In the cross-section, the impact of credits on earnings and employment remains 
positive and significant, suggesting that one year of full-time college attendance leads to a $240 
increase in quarterly earnings (an approximately 14 percent increase from pre-welfare earnings) 
and a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of being employed in a given quarter. 
However, when I include individual fixed effects, credits are no longer significantly related to 
earnings or employment. Surprisingly, the coefficients representing the impacts of degree receipt 
are quite similar in the cross sectional and fixed effects estimates. 
All vocational degrees and credentials offered by community colleges in Colorado 
significantly raise quarterly earnings and employment. Even a short-term certificate, requiring 
less than one year of full-time attendance, increases earnings by $480 per quarter (a 28 percent 
increase from pre-welfare earnings). Longer term certificates result in slightly higher (but not 
statistically distinguishable) gains. Women who earn an AAS degree experience the largest 
increases in earnings and employment among community college attendees, with their earnings 
increasing by close to $2,500 per quarter (over a 100 percent increase). BA degree recipients see 
similar earnings gains, but the number of such individuals in my sample is quite small, so 
estimates relating to the outcomes of four-year college graduates should be interpreted with 
caution. Academic and general studies associate’s degree recipients do not experience any 
earnings or employment gains once time-invariant characteristics are accounted for.  
Table 2.3 subjects my main specification to a variety of robustness tests. In the first and 
fifth columns, I only examine women with a strong pre-welfare labor market attachment, to 
eliminate concerns that my results are driven by a negative correlation between employment and 
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post-entry college attendance. In columns 2 and 6, I eliminate women who were already 
attending college before entering welfare. In columns 3 and 7, I eliminate individuals who are 
still attending college at the end of my sample period, and in the last specification, I drop the 
quarters surrounding welfare entry where earnings display a dip. My results are quite consistent 
across specifications, with credentials and vocational associate’s degrees strongly correlated with 
earnings and employment gains, while AA/AGS degrees and credits alone do not result in 
improved labor market outcomes.  
In Table 2.4, I compare the impacts of credits and credentials, distinguishing math, 
science, and health-focused programs from other programs offered by community colleges. 
Jacobson et al. (2005) find that displaced workers who earn credits in these fields benefit the 
most on the labor market. Results including all credentials and credits by program are displayed 
in columns 1 and 3. I do not find evidence that credits from health, math, or science programs 
increase earnings or employment. Longer-term health, math, and science credentials lead to 
larger earnings gains than credentials from other programs, although the impacts of short term 
certificates on earnings and employment do not vary significantly by program. However, 
Jacobson et al. (2005) only observe associate degree receipt and do not observe whether 
individuals in their sample earn certificates. Thus, in columns 2 and 4, I treat certificates as 
unobservable and do find evidence of a positive impact of credits from math, health, and science 
programs on earnings (although not employment). When certificates are unobservable, estimates 
would erroneously suggest that credits from one year of full-time attendance in these programs 




2.5.2 Short-run Private and Social Returns 
Despite the large estimated impacts of credential receipt on employment and earnings, 
only 10 percent of women who attend college after entering Colorado’s welfare program obtain a 
certificate or degree. It is difficult to determine whether this behavior is optimal (e.g., women 
learn about their “type” after enrolling in college and realize their own personal returns are too 
small), due to a market failure (e.g., credit constraints), or a result of self-control issues (e.g., 
hyperbolic discounting). Without a source of exogenous variation in these parameters, it is 
difficult to determine which, if any, affect completion rates.  
Nonetheless, in Table 2.5, I document the extent to which credit constraints may be an 
issue for women in this population. My estimates thus far have looked at the post-enrollment 
impacts of college-going on labor market outcomes, not accounting for foregone earnings while 
attending college. Additionally, from the Colorado Department of Higher Education, I observe 
financial aid women received while in college and the total cost of attendance in a given 
semester, giving me an accurate measure of the direct costs of college-going. The first two 
columns of Table 2.5 take these indirect costs into consideration. The dependent variable in 
column 1 is quarterly earnings, but I account for the indirect cost of schooling due to foregone 
earnings by including the impacts of degree and credit receipt both before and after college exit. 
Since I only observe women who earn a credential for one or two years after exit, while, as 
shown in Figure 2.2, women spend up to three years in college, these estimates will represent 
short-run returns. In comparison, the estimates presented in the beginning of this section 
represent medium- to long-run returns (depending on assumptions about age-earnings profiles).  
After accounting for foregone earnings, the only community college credential recipients 
who experience a positive return on their investment in the short-run are women who earn AAS 
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degrees, and the estimated impact on quarterly earnings falls to $500 per quarter. After 
accounting for direct and indirect costs of college attendance, even these women do not 
experience a significant return on their investment. Estimated returns to all other community 
college credentials and credits are negative and in some cases quite large. For instance, women 
who earn a longer-term certificate experience a $1,200 reduction in quarterly earnings. Although 
the majority of women who attend college receive both grants and loans from Colorado and the 
federal government, tuition and fees are substantially higher than the value of this aid.9 
In the third and fourth columns of Table 2.5, I investigate the extent to which Colorado’s 
safety net can mitigate these costs by taking into account the value of cash assistance (column 3) 
and subsidized child care (column 4) while on welfare.10 Cash assistance provide through 
Colorado’s welfare program does little to cushion women from the costs of college attendance. 
Even after accounting for the potential value of child care subsidies, most credential recipients 
do not experience a positive rate of return to their investment in the short run. If many of my 
sample members are credit constrained, in the short-run these negative returns could reduce 
educational attainment.  
In the final two columns of Table 2.5, I attempt to investigate the potential social returns 
to college attendance by estimating impacts of credit and degree receipt on the probability of 
reentering welfare and the value of cash assistance received after a sample member’s initial spell. 
I find little evidence in the way of positive social returns to higher education. However, the latter 
part of my sample period also coincides with changes in federal policy that increased the 
                                                
9 I treat loans as grant aid while in school and assume 30 years of repayment following college exit.  
 
10 Women on welfare with children under 13 are eligible for child care subsidies. I do not directly observe child care 
subsidies, which vary by county and child age.  However, in each county, the reimbursement rate is set to 75 percent 
of the market rate, which I do observe and use to impute the value of a mother’s potential subsidy based on the 
number and age of her children. 
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pressure on states to reduce caseloads and enforce participation requirements for current 
recipients, making these results suggestive at best.  
2.6 Conclusions  
Using an individual fixed effects approach, I find that women at risk for welfare receipt benefit 
from college attendance, although the impacts driven credential receipt. Even women who 
receive a certificate for less than one year of full-time study see their earnings increase by close 
to $500 per quarter. These are significant gains, given that on average, these women only earned 
$1,700 per quarter prior to welfare entry. Women who earn a terminal associate’s degree see 
their earnings increase by close to $2,500 per quarter. The sole exception is for women receiving 
associate of arts and general studies degrees. These women experienced only small increases in 
earnings. Credentials earned in health, math, and science programs lead to larger earnings gains. 
However, converse to prior findings, credits earned in these programs do not appear to affect 
earnings or employment once certificate receipt is accounted for. 
My results and approach have important limitations. Since I only observe individuals for 
up to 14 quarters after welfare entry, I can only estimate the medium-term impacts of credentials 
on labor market outcomes. If some degrees, such as AA/AGS, take longer to produce earnings 
gains, results will not represent the long-run impact of higher education. Second, including 
individual-specific fixed effects essentially estimates individual-deviations from mean wages 
after college attendance and degree receipt. However, if time-varying unobservable 
characteristics are correlated with both the decision to attend college and outcomes, my estimates 
will still include this selection bias. Finally, I only observe college attendance and degree receipt 
at public institutions in Colorado. Cellini and Chaudhary (2011) find that the returns to private, 
two-year degrees are similar to the returns to degrees earned at community colleges. It is likely 
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that some women in my sample attended one of the 312 private technical schools licensed to 
operate in Colorado. Thus, my estimates are likely a lower bound of the returns to higher 
education.  
 These results have implications for how welfare policy and policy aimed at two-year 
schools can positively impact the labor market outcomes for low-skilled individuals. In 
particular, these results suggest that providing supports to ensure community college students 
receive a degree, even certificates for short-term periods of attendance, can substantially increase 
earnings. Many recent policies aimed at potential community college students primarily focus on 
college entry. My results suggest that the marginal student affected by these policies may not 
benefit substantially unless additional supports for degree completion are provided.  
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2.7  Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Concurrent College Attendance and Cash Assistance Receipt,  
September 2004 – December 2012 

















































































































































Notes: Each circle represents the percentage of adult female TANF recipients attending a 
public college, with larger circles indicating larger total caseloads. The black dashed lines 
represent a linear fit of college going for three periods: before the Deficit Reduction Act 
(DRA) final rules were released, between 0 and 12 months after the rules were released, and 
12 or more months after the rules were released.  
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Figure 2.2: Average Quarterly Earnings by Educational Attainment following Welfare Entry 
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Notes: Thick lines represent average quarterly earnings before and after welfare entry by 




No Degree Any Degee
Number of individuals 23,115 3,329 380 2,732
Race
Hispanic 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.28
Native American or Asian/Pacific Islander 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Black 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.2
White 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.48
Characteristics at welfare entry
Age 30 28 28 28
Never married 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.60
Number of children 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9
Age of youngest child 4 4 3 4
Lifetime months on welfare 9.2 8.9 6.0 11.0
First spell on welfare 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.16
Own vehicle 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.40
Disabled 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.12
Average quarterly earnings before entry (2010$) $1,357 $1,642 $1,768 $1,544
Percentage of quarters worked before entry 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.51
Prior college attendance (1990 or later) 0.15 0.27 0.34 1.00
Prior credits earned (1990 or later) 4 10 19 50
Outcomes
Percentage of quarters employed after entry 0.40 0.51 0.53 0.51
Average quarterly earnings (2010$)
All quarters after entry $1,589 $1,870 $2,092 $2,119
1 year after entry $1,549 $1,890 $1,293 $1,839
2 years after entry $1,707 $2,139 $1,854 $2,298
3 years after entry $1,654 $2,133 $2,541 $2,510
4 years after entry $1,614 $2,017 $2,765 $2,456
Percentage of quarters on welfare 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.28
Percentage of quarters in school 0 0.24 0.42 0.23
Credits earned 0 19 67 25
Degree received
Certificate (less than 1 year) 0 0 0.53 0.03
Certificate (1 to less than 2 years) 0 0 0.14 0.02
Associate of Arts/General Studies 0 0 0.17 0.05
Associate of Applied Science 0 0 0.11 0.02
Bachelor's Degree 0 0 0.05 0.04
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Colorado Works Recipients by College Attendance and Degree Receipt
College Attendance
Data: CDHS program data, CDLE quarterly earnings records, and CDHE enrollment and degree files. Notes: Sample 
includes female adult Colorado Works recipients who began a spell of welfare receipt between 10/2004 and 6/2007.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credits | No degree
Health/Math/Science 1.84 4.53 0.0002 0.0002
(1.83) (1.91)* (0.0004) (0.0003)
Other program 0.29 0.03 0.0001 0.0001
(0.96) (0.81) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Test of equality (p-value) 0.484 0.043 0.996 0.866
Short-term Certificate
Health/Math/Science 619.14 -- 0.113 --
(153.60)** (0.028)**
Other 374.09 -- 0.060 --
(179.27)* (0.032)+
Test of equality (p-value) 0.313 0.210
Certificate
Health/Math/Science 1,538.21 -- 0.159 --
(406.24)** (0.042)**
Other two-year program 415.82 -- 0.128 --
(183.87)* (0.036)**
Test of equality (p-value) 0.013 0.586
Associate of Applied Science
Health/Math/Science 3,904.54 3,674.91 0.241 0.213
(569.33)** (563.18)** (0.042)** (0.041)**
Other two-year program 439.45 416.94 0.084 0.077
(335.82) (333.20) (0.044)+ (0.044)+
Test of equality (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.025
Associate of Arts/GS -156.31 -141.91 0.026 0.025
(186.29) (185.66) (0.034) (0.034)
Bachelor's Degree 2,646.35 2,646.82 0.201 0.200
(294.02)** (293.61)** (0.033)** (0.033)**
Observations 857,124 857,124 857,124 857,124
Data: CDHS program data, CDLE quarterly earnings records, and CDHE enrollment and degree files. Notes: + 
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust standard errors clustered by individual in
parentheses; each column denotes a separate regression. Regressions include year, quarter, and individual fixed
effects, an indicator for college attendance, and a linear cohort trend allowing for a trend break at entry.
Regressions also control for vehicle ownership, number of children, age of youngest child, presence of a
disability, months on cash assistance (0, 1 to 12, 13 to 24, 25 or more), quarterly county unemployment rates,
and a quadratic in age. Columns 2 and 4 assume certificates are unobservable. All dollar amounts adjusted for
inflation (2010$).
Table 2.4: The Returns to College Credits and Degrees by Program

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Design of Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: 
Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program 
 
 




Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for their lack of performance pay. In other 
sectors, incentive pay increases worker effort and output by aligning the interests of workers and 
employers, providing information about the most valued aspects of an employee’s job, and 
motivating workers to provide costly effort (Gibbons 1998; Lazear and Oyer 2010). In this paper, 
we examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented by the New York City 
Department of Education (DOE) and investigate whether specific features of the program 
contributed to its ineffectiveness.  
In 2007, close to two hundred schools were randomly selected from a group of high-
poverty schools.1 These schools could earn school-wide bonuses by surpassing goals primarily 
based on student achievement. Successful schools would earn lump sum payments equal to 
$3000 per union teacher (three to seven percent of annual teacher pay). Several independent 
studies show that the bonus program had little overall effect on either math or reading 
achievement (Springer and Winters 2009; Goodman and Turner 2010; Fryer 2011). We show 
that in schools where smaller groups of teachers were responsible for instructing tested students, 
the program led to small but significant increases in student achievement. Our finding is 
consistent with predictions that group-based incentives are diluted by the potential for free-riding 
when payments depend on actions of a large number of workers (Holmstrom 1982).  
Several features of the educational sector complicate the design of teacher performance 
pay. First, performance pay is most effective when employers can measure worker output or 
when observable effort and productivity are closely aligned. Monitoring teachers is costly and 
                                                 
1 This experiment was designed and implemented by the New York City Department of Education and teachers’ 
union, random assignment was conducted by Roland Fryer, and RAND performed the official evaluation.  
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measuring individual teachers’ contributions to student achievement is difficult. Second, 
although education is a complex good and teachers must allocate their effort across several 
activities, teacher incentive pay is often linked to a single performance measure (e.g., student test 
scores), which may lead teachers to direct effort away from other beneficial classroom activities 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).2 Despite these issues, studies from outside the United States 
demonstrate that teacher incentive pay can increase student achievement (e.g., Lavy 2002; Lavy 
2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). 
 Specific features of the NYC bonus program may have limited its effectiveness. First, the 
program linked incentive pay to school-wide performance goals. In theory, group incentive pay 
is most effective in the context of a joint production technology (Itoh, 1991). For instance, if an 
individual teacher’s effort has positive impacts on the effort exerted by her peers (e.g., Jackson 
and Bruegmann 2009), group incentives may outperform individual incentives. Otherwise, 
relative to individual incentives, group incentives decrease individual returns to effort and will 
lead to free-riding unless workers monitor each other’s effort. 
We test for free-riding by allowing the bonus program’s impacts to vary by the number of 
teachers with students who are tested (and therefore contribute to the probability that a school 
qualifies for the bonus award). To test for the importance of joint production and monitoring, we 
examine whether program impacts vary by the degree to which teachers report collaborating in 
lesson planning and instruction using a survey administered prior to program implementation. 
We show that the bonus program raised math achievement in schools with a small number of 
teachers with tested students, although these impacts are small (0.08 student-level standard 
                                                 
2 Teachers may also be induced to focus on narrow, exam-related basic skills, manipulate test scores, or focus on 
students whose performance contributes more towards goals (e.g., Jacob and Levitt 2003; Jacob 2005; Cullen and 
Reback 2006; Neal and Schanzenbach 2010). 
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deviations) and only marginally significant in the program’s second year. We present suggestive 
evidence of positive program impacts in schools with a high degree of collaboration.  
Second, teachers already faced negative incentives when the bonus program was 
implemented. In fall 2007, the DOE instituted a district-wide accountability system that imposed 
sanctions on schools that did not meet the same goals used in determining bonus receipt. Thus, 
estimated impacts of the bonus program represent the effect of teacher performance pay in 
schools already under accountability pressure. However, this may be the most appropriate 
context to examine, since many states have implemented accountability systems and all public 
school districts face pressure from No Child Left Behind provisions. Finally, we find no 
differences in the impacts of the bonus program when we compare schools under different 
degrees of accountability pressure, suggesting that our results are not solely driven by the 
dilution of incentives due to the accountability system.  
Third, teachers’ lack of understanding of the bonus program’s complex goals may have 
limited its efficacy. Alternatively, since bonus awards were provided if a school’s performance 
reached a set threshold, if thresholds were set too high or too low, a large number of teachers 
may have optimally responded by not changing their behavior (Neal 2011). However, the metrics 
used to determine bonus payments were the same goals used by the district-wide accountability 
system and Rockoff and Turner (2010) show that negative incentives provided through this 
system increased student achievement.3 
The next section of this chapter describes New York City’s bonus program. Section 3.3 
provides an overview of the data and estimation framework while Section 3.4 presents results 
and the fifth section concludes. 
                                                 
3 On a related note, a committee within each school had some discretion over how bonuses would be distributed. 
However, the distribution scheme was set ex ante and most schools chose equal or close to equal distributions. 
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3.2 The New York City Bonus Program  
We use a policy experiment implemented by the New York City Department of Education 
(DOE) in the fall of 2007, the “School-Wide Performance Bonus Program” (hereafter, the bonus 
program). Both the DOE and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) endorsed the program as 
an innovative model for teacher performance pay. In November 2007, 181 schools serving 
kindergarten through eighth grade were randomly selected from a group of 309 schools 
designated as “high need”; 128 schools were assigned to the treatment group. Two of the 181 
schools originally assigned to the treatment group were moved to the control group prior to 
notification of their assignment; for the purposes of our analyses, we consider these schools as 
part of the original treatment group. Treatment schools were eligible to participate in the 
program, contingent on 55 percent of a school’s full-time United Federal of Teachers (UFT) staff 
voting in favor of participation. Twenty-five schools voted not to participate or withdrew from 
the program following a vote of approval. Finally, four schools originally assigned to the control 
group were allowed to vote and ultimately chose to participate in the bonus program; for the 
purposes of our analyses, we consider these schools as part of the original control group. 
However, the group of schools that ultimately could earn bonus payments totaled 158.  
The schools that voted in favor of the program could earn a lump-sum bonus by meeting 
a school-wide goal. These goals were tied to the NYC accountability system which awarded 
letter grades to schools (explained below) and were primarily based on student achievement on 
state math and reading exams. Schools that achieved their goals received lump sum bonuses 
equal to $3,000 per union teacher, while schools that fell short but managed to meet 75 percent 
of their goal received $1,500 per union teacher. Thus, although total bonus awards varied across 
schools with different numbers of union teachers, the expected bonus payment was equal across 
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these schools. Schools that did not reach their target suffered no consequences beyond the 
absence of bonus pay. The full $3,000 award represents a seven percent increase in the salary of 
teachers at the bottom of the pay scale and a three percent increase for the most experienced 
teachers.4  
Each participating school selected a four-member compensation committee, consisting of 
the principal, a second administrator, and two union representatives elected by the school’s UFT 
members. In the program’s first year, this committee was required to submit a bonus distribution 
scheme after students took the state math and reading exams but before exam results were 
released. Thus, at least in the first year of the program, teachers’ effort decisions should not be 
affected by the distribution that was ultimately chosen. Program guidelines stipulated that within 
schools reaching their goal, all union teachers must receive a bonus payment and individual 
bonuses could not be explicitly based on seniority. Beyond these requirements, committees had 
complete freedom in determining individual teachers’ bonus payments and could also provide 
bonus payments to other school employees. Around half of treatment schools chose an 
approximately equal distribution (i.e., the difference between the highest and lowest bonus 
payment was less than $100). In the remainder of schools, the difference between the highest and 
lowest bonus ranged from $200 to $5000.  
The 2007-2008 school year also marked the implementation of the DOE’s new 
accountability system. Under this system, schools received accountability grades designed to 
summarize a school’s overall performance on a multidimensional metric of student learning.5 
                                                 
4 Similar to the majority of public school districts in the U.S., teacher salaries in New York City are determined 
through a schedule based on years of experience and graduate coursework (Podgursky and Springer 2007).  
 
5 The metric includes a measure of school environment (student attendance and results from survey of parents, 
teachers, and students), student performance (average student achievement on reading and math exams, median 
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Each school’s performance was scored relative to the entire district and to a group of peer 
schools. This group included the 40 schools that were most similar according to a “peer index” 
that was based on student demographic characteristics and prior achievement.6 Each school 
received a progress report documenting its overall performance, the corresponding accountability 
grade, and a target score for the following year. Schools with lower accountability grades needed 
to make larger improvements to reach their targets. Importantly, these target scores determined 
which schools participating in the bonus program received awards.  
Moreover, the accountability system provided additional incentives to improve student 
achievement, regardless of bonus program participation. Schools that earned an A or B 
accountability grade received rewards (e.g., principal bonuses, additional funds when students 
transferred from schools receiving a poor grade), while schools that received D and F grades 
faced consequences (e.g., school closure and principal removal).  Although this accountability 
system was more complex than systems based on a single metric (e.g., the percentage of students 
achieving proficiency), teachers and administrators received training on how to interpret the 
complicated set of measures determining a school’s grade, and it was clear that grades were 
largely determined by student performance on math and reading exams. Rockoff and Turner 
(2010) find that receiving an F or D led to a significant improvement in student test scores, a 
result consistent with school employees understanding that performance under the accountability 
system was dependent on student achievement. Bonus program impacts do not vary across 
schools with different accountability grades (see Section 4). However, it is still important to note 
                                                                                                                                                             
proficiency, and percentage students achieving proficiency), and student progress (average change and percent 
making progress on math and reading exams). Schools received extra credit for progress among high-need students. 
 
6 For elementary schools and schools serving kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8), the peer index was based on 
a function of the percentage of students that were English language learner (ELL), special education, Title I free 




that our results represent the impact of group-based teacher performance pay for schools already 
under accountability pressure.  
The timing of program announcement and the selection of schools into the treatment 
group did not allow much room for behavioral responses to the program in its first year. The 
school vote took place in November 2007, less than two months before the January reading exam 
and less than four months before the March math exam.7 The program continued into the 2008-
2009 school year and all but three of the participating schools voted to continue participation.8 
Of the 158 schools that voted to participate in the first year of the program, 87 (55 percent) 
received bonus payments. The bonus pool averaged approximately $160,500 per school, and 
totaled $14.0 million in the first year. In the second year of the program, the vast majority of the 
151 schools that eligible to receive bonuses earned awards, totaling $27.1 million.  
3.3 Data and Empirical Framework 
Our analyses focus on schools classified as elementary, middle, and kindergarten through grade 
8 (K-8) schools eligible for selection into the bonus program. A total of 181 schools were chosen 
to participate in the bonus program; 128 schools were placed in the control group. We use 
publicly available DOE data and measure academic achievement using average math and reading 
test scores in the 2006-07, 2007-08, and 2008-09 school years (hereafter 2007, 2008, and 2009).  
We measure teacher absences, teacher turnover, and the characteristics of newly hired 
teachers using aggregate statistics from data on individual teachers.9  In some specifications, we 
                                                 
7 However, even given this short time period, the NYC accountability system led to significant improvements in 
math and, albeit smaller, improvements in reading (Rockoff and Turner 2010).  
 
8 Schools that voted no in the first year of the program were not given a second chance to vote on the program. 
However, we still consider these schools as part of the group originally assigned to the treatment group. 
  
9 We thank Jonah Rockoff for constructing these aggregate statistics for the purpose of this research.  
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include information on school demographic characteristics (the percentage of students in each 
school that are English Language Learners (ELL), special education students, Title I free lunch 
recipients, and minorities) and each schools performance under the new NYC accountability 
system, including each school’s accountability score and peer index. 
3.3.1 Was Randomization Successful? 
Our ability to make causal inferences about the effects of teacher incentive pay depends 
on the success of random assignment. In Table 3.1, we present comparisons of the characteristics 
of treatment and control groups prior to random assignment, where the treatment group includes 
schools that were initially selected but did not participate. Treatment and control schools are 
similar in terms of enrollment, accountability outcomes, student demographics, and teacher 
characteristics. We find no significant differences between the observable characteristics of 
treatment and control schools, suggesting a causal interpretation of our results is valid.  
We also compare the characteristics of the 309 schools in the experimental sample to 
other schools in NYC.10 Given that schools with low peer indices were eligible for selection into 
the bonus program, it is not surprising that the experimental sample differs from the remainder of 
NYC schools across a number of dimensions. Schools in the experimental sample had a higher 
proportion of English Language Learners (ELL), special education, minority students, and 
students eligible for the Title I free lunch program, as well as lower average math and reading 
scores.  Teachers in the experimental sample had slightly less experience and almost twice as 
many absences than teachers in other NYC schools.  Finally, experimental schools had lower 
enrollment and fewer teachers than other schools. 
                                                 
10 We restrict our universe to the 923 schools serving students in kindergarten through eighth grade that received 
accountability grades and were not charter schools or schools that only serve special education students. 
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Table 3.2 compares the characteristics of schools by whether or not they voted to 
participate in the program. Schools voting “no” are largely similar to schools that voted in favor 
of the program, although, on average, these 25 schools were relatively less disadvantaged and 
their students had higher test scores. 
3.3.2 Regression Framework 
We estimate the main effect of the bonus program using the following model: 
(3.1)    jtjtjt Dy   βX jt  
where jty is the outcome of interest for school j in year t, jtD  is an indicator selection into the 
bonus program’s treatment group (regardless of whether the school ultimately participated), jtX is 
a vector of school characteristics, and jt is an idiosyncratic error term.
11 School observations are 
weighted by the number of tested students. With successful random assignment, jtD  is 
independent of omitted variables and ̂ represents the casual impact of the bonus program.  
3.4 Results 
To preview our estimates of the impact of the bonus program on student achievement, Figures 
3.1 and 3.2 display the distribution of average math and reading scores within treatment and 
control schools in 2007, 2008, and 2009.  On average, all NYC schools experienced an increase 
in average student performance in the two years following the implementation of the program; 
this pattern holds in the experimental sample. If the bonus program had an impact on test scores, 
we should observe a rightward shift in the distribution among treatment schools, relative to 
                                                 
11 Covariates include the outcome measured in 2007, school type indicators (i.e., elementary, middle, or K-8), the 
percentage of students that are English Language Learners, special education, Title I free lunch recipients, and 
minorities, and performance under the NYC accountability system (school accountability scores and peer indices).  
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control schools. The distribution of math and reading scores do not differ significantly between 
treatment and control schools in either 2008 or 2009.  
3.4.1 Math and Reading Achievement 
Table 3.3, which displays results from regressions estimating the impact of the program 
on average math and reading exam scores, confirms these findings. We find little evidence that 
the program led to increases in math and reading achievement and, if anything, it appears that 
eligibility to earn bonuses had a negative impact on math achievement. Panels A and B examine 
the first and second years of the program separately. The point estimates for 2008 are negative 
and quite small, although precisely estimated.12 In the second year of the program, eligibility to 
earn bonuses had no effect on student achievement in reading and a small negative impact on 
math scores, leading to an approximately 0.08 standard deviation reduction in math 
achievement.13  
3.4.2 Group Bonuses and the Free-rider Problem 
Teachers should respond to the bonus program by increasing their effort until the 
expected marginal benefit is equal to the expected marginal cost. However, the probability that a 
treated school reaches its goal and receives a bonus primarily depends on students’ performance 
on math and reading exams. Thus, the impact of an individual’s teacher’s effort on her expected 
bonus is decreasing as the number of teachers with tested students increases.14 The diffusion of 
                                                 
12 For instance, our IV estimates reject effects as small as a 0.7 point increase in reading achievement and a 0.2 point 
increase in math. These effects are quite small in magnitude, given the 2008 student level standard deviation in test 
scores was 35 points for reading and 31 points for math.  
 
13 Four schools in the treatment group were closed at the end of the 2008 school year, thus, our sample decreases by 
four in the second set of regressions. Our 2008 results remain unchanged when we restrict the sample to only 
include schools open in both 2008 and 2009.  
 
14 Consider two extremes, a school with only one teacher with tested students and a school with an infinite number 
of these teachers. In the first case, the teacher will either respond to the program by increasing her effort to the 
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responsibility for test score gains across many teachers may dilute the incentives of the bonus 
scheme. Moreover, monitoring may be more difficult in schools with more teachers. 
We test for evidence of free-riding by allowing treatment effects on math and reading 
scores to vary by the number of math and reading teachers, respectively. We only focus on 
teachers whose students take these exams, rather than the full set of teachers in a school, since 
only teachers with tested students contribute to the probability that a school earns its bonus.15 
The first set of regressions in Table 3.4 show the main effect of the bonus program on math and 
reading achievement.16 We first add an interaction between the number of math/reading teachers 
(relative to the mean number of such teachers in the sample) and the treatment indicator 
(columns 2 and 5), and finally, interact treatment status with an indicator for schools in the 
bottom quartile of the number of teachers with tested students (approximately 10 or fewer 
teachers in elementary and K-8 schools and 5 or fewer in middle schools). We only present 
results from specifications that include covariates, however, results are similar when we exclude 
covariates or instrument for actual treatment with initial assignment.  
We find evidence of free-riding. For schools at the bottom of the distribution of the 
number of teachers with tested students, we estimate a positive effect of the bonus program on 
math achievement in the first year of the program and a positive, but insignificant effect in the 
second year, although we cannot reject a test of equality of effects across years. In 2008, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
expected level necessary to achieve the school’s goal or not respond (if the size of the bonus is less than the cost of 
exerting this level of effort). In the second case, changes in a given teacher’s effort do not affect the probability that 
the school receives the bonus and it will be optimal for teachers to not respond to the program.  
 
15 On average, treatment and control group schools have 55 teachers in total, but only 16 teach tested students. 
 
16 The small number of middle and K-8 schools that are missing information on the number of teachers with tested 
subjects are excluded. 
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bonus program resulted in a 3.2 point (0.08 student-level standard deviation) increase in math 
achievement.17  
Group-based incentive pay may outperform individual incentives in the case of joint 
production. If the degree to which teachers work together varies across schools, the bonus 
program may have been effective in schools with a high level of cooperation between teachers. 
To proxy for the extent of joint production in a school, we construct a measure of school 
cohesiveness using teachers' answers to a set of five survey questions prior to the announcement 
of the bonus program.18 This measure may also incorporate the degree to which teachers are able 
to monitor their colleagues. We sum responses across survey questions and standardize the index 
so it has a mean of zero and standard deviation equal to one. Schools with high levels of 
cohesion are distinct from those with a small number of teachers with tested students.19  
Table 3.5 tests for heterogeneity in the impact of the bonus program by school cohesion. 
We first interact treatment with the linear index (columns 2 and 5) and then interact treatment 
with an indicator for schools with above average cohesion (columns 3 and 6). The point 
estimates for schools with below average cohesion are marginally significant and negative in 
both subjects and both years, while the interaction of treatment and the indicator for above 
average cohesion is significant, positive, and of greater magnitude. Results suggest that the 
                                                 
17 Another implication of this finding is that, in schools with a large number of teachers with tested students, the 
bonus program had a negative impact on student achievement. One explanation is the bonus program crowded out 
teachers’ intrinsic motivation and only in schools where incentives were not diluted by free-riding did the potential 
monetary rewards lead to increased teacher effort.  
 
18 These surveys were administered in spring 2007. Questions include: (1) the extent to which teachers report feeling 
supported by fellow teachers, (2) whether curriculum and instruction is aligned within and across school grades, (3) 
whether the principal involves teachers in decision making, (4) whether school leaders encourage collaboration, and 
(5) whether teachers collaborate to improve instruction. We exclude schools with a survey response rate under 10%.  
 
19 This index has a small, negative, and statistically insignificant correlation with the number of math and reading 
teachers in a school. 
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bonus program may have had detrimental effects in schools with low levels of cohesion, and 
small positive effects on achievement in cohesive schools.  
3.4.3 Teacher Effort 
A primary motivation for performance-based pay is to provide teachers with incentives to 
increase effort devoted to raising student achievement. Although we do not directly observe 
teacher effort, we can measure teacher attendance, which may be correlated with effort decisions 
and contributes to student achievement (e.g., Miller, Murnane, and Willett 2008; Herrmann and 
Rockoff forthcoming). We measure teacher absences using aggregate statistics from individual 
teacher data and estimate models where the dependent variable is the average number of 
absences taken during the months when schools first learned of their eligibility for the bonus 
program and when the last exams were taken. If teachers believe that their attendance can affect 
the probability of bonus receipt by raising student achievement, the program’s impacts on 
absenteeism should be largest over this period.20 We only examine absences that teachers likely 
have some control over – those taken for illness and personal reasons.  
Table 3.6 presents these results; each column within a panel contains the estimates from 
separate regressions. The first column examines the effect of the bonus program on absences 
across all teachers within a school and shows no measurable impact on overall attendance. 
Column 2 focuses on teachers with tested students, while the third and fourth columns follow the 
same approach as Table 3.4 and interact the treatment indicator with the number of teachers with 
tested students (column 3) or an indicator for whether a school falls in the bottom quartile of the 
number of such teachers (column 4).  
                                                 
20 In the first year of the program, schools learned of their eligibility in November while in the second year, 
eligibility was known in September. In both years, the last exams occurred in March. Results are robust to alternate 
definitions of the time period (e.g., November to March in the second year or September to March in the first year). 
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Program impacts on attendance are not consistent across years. In the program’s first 
year, for schools with a small number of teachers with tested students, attendance increased.21 
Conversely, in the second year of the program, we find positive but insignificant impacts on 
absenteeism. Finally, we test whether the bonus program had heterogeneous impacts according 
to initial teacher effort. For instance, initially low effort (high absence) teachers may be the only 
group with the ability to respond through increasing attendance. Conversely, if ex ante high 
effort teachers believed that achieving the bonus program goals was a high probability event, 
they may have responded by reducing their effort. However, we find no evidence teacher 
absenteeism varies along this dimension (available upon request). In the United States, 
attendance may not be the dimension along which teachers respond to incentive pay.  
3.4.4 Bonuses and School Accountability 
Finally, we test whether the NYC accountability system, also implemented in 2007, 
contributed to the bonus program’s ineffectiveness. Teachers may have already adjusted their 
effort or teaching practices in response to the accountability system’s incentives. If teachers face 
decreasing marginal returns or increasing marginal costs to effort, the size of potential bonus 
payments may not be large enough to induce additional effort.  
To evaluate this possibility, we take advantage of the fact that treatment schools face 
different incentives according to their accountability grades. Both treatment and control schools 
receiving low grades had additional motivation to improve student test scores, as they faced 
school closure or principal removal if student achievement did not improve in the following year. 
Conversely, schools receiving an A on their progress report generally needed to make the 
smallest gains to receive a bonus, thus, the program may not have provided a large incentive to 
                                                 
21 However, impacts are only significant in schools at the 10th percentile in the distribution of number of teachers 
(results available upon request).  
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teachers in treatment schools to alter their behavior. Treatment and control schools in the middle 
of the grade distribution faced the largest difference in incentives. We test whether treatment 
effects vary along this dimension, grouping schools into three separate bins by their 
accountability grades: A, B or C, and D or F. We find no significant differences in treatment 
effects between these grade groupings or for schools at the center of the grade distribution where 
the difference in incentives between treatment and control schools are largest (Table 3.7).   
3.5 Conclusions 
In many sectors, performance-based pay enhances effort, output, and other desirable outcomes. 
Evidence from Israel and India suggests that properly structured teacher incentive pay programs 
can benefit students. However, despite substantial expenditures – over $40 million in the 
program’s first two years – the NYC bonus program did not raise student achievement. This 
paper discusses several features of the NYC bonus program that may have contributed to its 
ineffectiveness. We provide suggestive evidence that the group-based structure of the program 
may have been detrimental in the majority of schools where the number of teachers responsible 
for tested students is large. Conversely, the program improved math achievement in schools with 
fewer teachers responsible for tested students or a more cohesive group of teachers. A lack of 
monitoring as well as the diffusion of responsibility for test score gains among many teachers 
may have diluted the incentives of the opportunity to earn bonuses. Our results are consistent 
with the long-standing literature in economics on the importance of taking into consideration 
free-riding, joint production, and monitoring when designing incentive systems and suggest that 
a one-size-fits-all approach may not be the most effective when implementing incentive pay 
schemes within a school district.  
110
 
Given that team-based incentives in other contexts resulted in student achievement gains, 
other features of the NYC program may have also contributed to its ineffectiveness. Neal (2011) 
suggests that results from economic theory offer valuable insights into optimal incentive design.  
For instance, an intervention in India utilized a piece-rate payment scheme: teachers or schools 
received bonus payments for incremental improvements in student achievement (Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman 2011). This avoids threshold effects of schemes like the NYC bonus program, 
which dilute incentives for teachers with a probability of bonus receipt approaches zero or one.  
Even so, many challenges in designing effective teacher incentive schemes remain. 
Incentive pay programs that come about as a compromise between school districts and teachers 
unions’ might contain incentives that are so diluted they are destined to fail. Finally, the 
extensive margin may be most important margin through which teacher pay can improve student 
achievement. Small-scale teacher incentive pay experiments cannot provide information 
concerning the general equilibrium effects of overall increase in teacher pay or movement 
towards performance-based compensation.  
Currently, the U.S. government provides significant funding through the Race to the Top 
program. Eligibility for Race to the Top funding depends on districts’ ability and willingness to 
link student achievement to individual teachers and use this data in teacher evaluations, but 
grants districts a great deal of discretion in designing performance pay systems. In 2010, 62 
school districts and nonprofit groups received over $400 million in funding from the federal 
Teacher Incentive Fund. Our results underscore the importance of the structure of performance 
pay in education. Policy innovations in this area should be carefully considered, taking into 
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Number of Schools 181 128 614
Average enrollment 558 558 0 0.852 687
Average enrollment, tested grades 363 367 -4 0.912 459
Fraction elementary school 0.62 0.63 -0.01 0.788 0.63
Fraction middle school 0.26 0.27 -0.01 0.586 0.24
Fraction K-8 school 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.452 0.13
School Accountability Outcomes
Peer index (mean = 0, sd = 1) -0.91 -0.93 0.02 0.452 0.44
Overall accountability score 52.6 52.1 0.6 0.750 54.6
Target score 66.3 65.9 0.4 0.772 67.8
Student Characteristics
Average math scale score (2007) 656 655 1 0.497 677
Change in math scale score (2006 to 2007) 10.5 10.3 0.2 0.741 8.7
Average reading scale score (2007) 640 640 1 0.603 660
Change in reading scale score (2006 to 2007) 1.4 1.9 -0.5 0.511 0.9
Fraction English Language Learner 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.614 0.11
Fraction special education 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.246 0.09
Fraction free lunch 0.87 0.89 -0.02 0.315 0.62
Fraction Hispanic 0.56 0.53 0.03 0.428 0.33
Fraction Black 0.41 0.43 -0.03 0.425 0.29
Fraction White 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.640 0.20
Teacher Characteristics
Number of teachers 55 55 0 0.952 60
Number of teachers, tested classrooms 16 16 -1 0.431 17
Average years of experience 7.9 8.0 -0.1 0.703 8.6
Average absences/teacher (2007) 7.2 7.0 0.2 0.447 6.7
Average absences/teacher, tested classrooms (2007) 7.4 7.2 0.3 0.377 7.0
Notes: Characteristics measured at beginning of 2007-2008 school year unless otherwise noted; average absences per teacher include absences 
taken for personal or sick leave.
Table 3.1: Baseline School Characteristics by Original Assignment to Treatment and Control Groups
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Number of Schools 158 25
Average enrollment 558 574 -16 0.754
Average enrollment, tested grades 364 361 3 0.939
Fraction elementary school 0.61 0.72 -0.11 0.284
Fraction middle school 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.487
Fraction K-8 school 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.508
School Accountability Outcomes
Peer index (mean = 0, sd = 1) -0.91 -0.87 -0.05 0.247
Overall accountability score 52.5 55.1 -2.5 0.452
Target score 66.3 68.2 -1.9 0.480
Student Characteristics
Average math scale score (2007) 655 661 -6 0.102
Change in math scale score (2006 to 2007) 10.7 10.2 0.5 0.704
Average reading scale score (2007) 640 644 -5 0.040
Change in reading scale score (2006 to 2007) 1.7 0.2 1.4 0.316
Fraction English Language Learner 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.549
Fraction special education 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.773
Fraction free lunch 0.88 0.86 0.02 0.608
Fraction Hispanic 0.56 0.54 0.03 0.672
Fraction Black 0.41 0.42 -0.01 0.868
Fraction White 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.772
Teacher Characteristics
Number of teachers 55 56 -2 0.707
Number of teachers, tested classrooms 15 17 -2 0.237
Average years of experience 7.9 8.4 -0.6 0.163
Average absences (2007) 7.1 7.1 0.0 0.426
Average absences, tested classrooms (2007) 7.0 7.2 -0.2 0.775
p-value
Notes: Characteristics measured at beginning of 2007-2008 school year unless otherwise noted; average absences per 
teacher include absences taken for personal or sick leave.
Table 3.2: Baseline School Characteristics by Participation Vote














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Year 1: 2007-2008
Treatment 0.001 -0.158 -0.217 -0.156
(0.091) (0.146) (0.148) (0.163)
* Number of teachers (mean = 0) 0.013
(0.022)
* First quartile of number of teachers -0.236
(0.390)
Treatment effect: schools in first quartile -0.391
(0.352)
Observations 301 301 301 301
B. Year 2: 2008-2009
Treatment 0.045 0.151 0.203 0.161
(0.119) (0.175) (0.192) (0.200)
* Number of teachers (mean = 0) 0.005
(0.032)
* First quartile of number of teachers 0.158
(0.621)
Treatment effect: schools in first quartile 0.319
(0.576)
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; each column within a panel denotes a separate 
regression; measures of the number of reading/math teachers are demeaned; dependent variable is average absences 
per teacher taken for personel or sick leave between November and March (Panel A) or September and March (Panel 
B); additional controls include: pre-treatment (2007) school test score, school level, peer index, overall accountability 
score, percentage of students ELL, special education, free lunch recipients, and student race (African American and 
Hispanic); regressions are weighted by number of tested students; schools with no teachers linked to tested students 
are dropped; the number of teachers for schools in the first quartile is less than or equal to: 10 (elementary 
schools),11 (middle and K-8 schools). 
Teachers of Tested Students
Table 3.6: The Impact of Teacher Incentives on Teacher Absences Due to Personal and Sick 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
A. Year 1: 2007 - 2008
Treatment*D or F -3.719 0.175 0.188 -5.292 -0.329 -0.379
(2.147)+ (1.116) (1.244) (3.407) (1.144) (1.279)
Treatment*B or C 0.454 -0.733 -0.892 0.944 -0.400 -0.470
(1.309) (0.615) (0.726) (2.163) (0.700) (0.825)
Treatment* A -1.856 0.063 0.091 -3.703 -1.542 -2.031
(2.489) (1.122) (1.439) (3.608) (1.084) (1.447)
Test A/B = C = D/F (pvalue) 0.231 0.698 0.685 0.238 0.653 0.625
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309
B. Year 2: 2007 - 2008
Treatment*D or F -3.533 -1.924 -3.246 -7.273 -3.326 -5.582
(2.321) (1.300) (2.178) (4.017)+ (2.388) (3.924)
Treatment*B or C -0.488 -0.379 -0.465 -0.686 -0.463 -0.574
(0.976) (0.435) (0.518) (1.888) (0.658) (0.786)
Treatment* A 1.179 -0.091 -0.113 1.511 -0.603 -0.749
(1.802) (0.686) (0.843) (2.726) (0.952) (1.174)
Test A/B = C = D/F (pvalue) 0.277 0.450 0.400 0.193 0.515 0.460
Observations 305 302 302 305 302 302
Additional covariates X X X X
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; each column within a panel denotes a
separate regression; dependent variable: school average reading or math scale score interacted with indicator
for school grade; robust standard errors in parentheses; all regressions weighted by number of students tested
in math or reading; additional covariates include: prior year scale score, indicators for school level, peer
index, overall accountability score, percentage of students ELL, special education, free lunch recipients, and
student race (African American and Hispanic); sample sizes differ across years due to the closure of four
schools at the end of the 2007-2008 school year and the elimination of an additional three schools that did
not receive 2008 accountability grades.
Table 3.7: Heterogeneity in Impact of Teacher Incentives on Student Math and Reading 
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